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This	   article	   contributes	   to	   the	   debate	   on	   the	   formalization	   of	   artisanal	   and	   small-­‐scale	  
mining	  (ASM)	  –	  low-­‐tech,	  labour-­‐intensive	  mineral	  extraction	  and	  processing	  –	  in	  developing	  
countries.	  	  A	  unique	  sector	  populated	  by	  an	  eclectic	  group	  of	  individuals,	  ASM	  has	  expanded	  
rapidly	   in	   all	   corners	   of	   the	   world	   in	   recent	   years.	   	   Most	   of	   its	   activities,	   however,	   are	  
informal,	  scattered	  across	  lands	  which	  are	  not	  officially	  titled.	   	   	  But	  growing	  recognition	  of	  
the	  sector's	  economic	  importance,	  particularly	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  has	  forced	  donors,	  and	  
to	   some	   extent,	   policymakers,	   to	   ‘rethink’	   development	   strategies	   for	   ASM.	   	   As	   part	   of	  
broader	   moves	   to	   improve	   the	   regulation	   of,	   and	   occasionally	   intensify	   the	   delivery	   of	  
assistance	  to,	  the	  sector,	  many	  are	  now	  searching	  frantically	  for	  fresh	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  bring	  
operations	   into	   the	   legal	   domain,	  where,	   it	   is	   believed,	   they	   can	  be	   regulated,	  monitored	  
and	  supported	  more	  effectively.	   	  A	  challenging	  exercise,	  this	  entails	  first	  determining,	  with	  
some	  degree	  of	  precision,	  why	  people	  choose	  to	  operate	  informally	  in	  this	  sector.	  	  	  Drawing	  
on	  analysis	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  findings	  from	  research	  conducted	  in	  Ghana	  and	  Niger,	  it	  
is	  argued	  that	  the	  legalist	  school	  (on	  informality)	   in	  part	  explains	  how	  governments	  across	  
sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  are	  ‘creating’	  bureaucracies	  which	  are	  stifling	  the	  formalization	  of	  ASM	  
activities	  in	  the	  region.	  	  A	  more	  nuanced	  development	  strategy	  grounded	  in	  local	  realities	  is	  
needed	   if	   formalization	   is	   to	   have	   a	   transformative	   effect	   on	   the	   livelihoods	   of	   those	  
engaged	  in	  ASM	  in	  the	  region	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  




In	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  the	  informal	  sector	  reigns.	  	  Since	  Hart	  (1973)	  coined	  the	  phrase	  in	  the	  
early-­‐1970s,	  countless	  assessments	  have	  emerged	  which	  paint	  a	  comprehensive	  picture	  of	  
the	   region’s	   fragmented	   labour	  markets	   and	   structures.	   	   The	  broad	   consensus	   is	   that	   the	  
informal	   sector	   employs	   an	   estimated	   three-­‐quarters	   of	   the	   active	  working	   population	   of	  
sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (ILO,	  2009).	  	  The	  literature	  identifies	  a	  host	  of	  interrelated	  reasons	  as	  to	  
why	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   including	   structural	   adjustment,	   which	   has	   caused	   unprecedented	  
retrenchment	   and	   unemployment;	   a	   sizable	   gulf	   between	   the	   rich	   and	   poor;	   and	  
disappointing	  economic	  growth	  (Crisp	  and	  Kelly,	  1999;	  Pegg,	  2003;	  Verick,	  2004;	  Heintz	  and	  
Valodia,	  2008).	  	  If	  harnessed	  effectively,	  however,	  the	  knowledge,	  skills	  and	  entrepreneurial	  
spirit	  found	  in	  the	  region’s	  informal	  economy	  could	  transform	  the	  lives	  of	  millions	  of	  people.	  
One	   industry	  which,	   if	   formalized,	   could	  make	  an	   immediate	   impact,	   economically,	   in	   the	  
region	   is	   artisanal	   and	   small-­‐scale	   mining	   (ASM):	   low-­‐tech,	   labour-­‐intensive	   mineral	  
extraction	  and	  processing.	  	  Although	  estimates	  vary,	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  
20	  million	  people	  employed	  directly	  in	  the	  sector,	  and	  an	  additional	  100	  million	  individuals	  
who	   depend	   upon	   its	   activities	   indirectly	   for	   their	   livelihoods.	   	   But	  whilst	   productive	   and	  
vibrant,	   the	   region’s	   ASM	   operations	   are	   mostly	   unlicensed	   and	   confined	   to	   informal	  
‘spaces’.	  	  For	  more	  than	  two	  decades,	  scholars,	  donors	  and	  policymakers	  have	  cited	  reasons	  
why,	   in	   the	  process	  building	  a	   case	   for	   formalizing	   the	   sector’s	   activities	   (Davidson,	  1993;	  
ILO,	  1999;	  Maconachie	  and	  Hilson,	  2011).	  	  The	  discussions	  put	  forward	  mostly	  focus	  on	  the	  
challenges	   facing	   individual	  miners,	   specifically	   the	  difficulties	   they	  often	  encounter	  when	  
attempting	  to	  obtain	  the	  requisite	  permits	  to	  operate	  legally.	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The	  purpose	  of	  this	  article	  is	  to	  further	  this	  analysis	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  how	  legislation,	  
policy	   frameworks	  and	  donor	  agendas	  are	   impeding	   the	   formalization	  of	  ASM	  across	   sub-­‐
Saharan	  Africa.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  reengages	  with	  and	  attempts	  to	  revive	  what	  many	  believe	  to	  
be	  obsolete	  and/or	  ambitious	   ideas	  put	   forward	  by	   the	  Peruvian	  economist	  Hernando	  De	  
Soto	   (De	   Soto,	   2000,	   2002),	   and	   the	   legalist	   school	   on	   informality	   more	   generally.	  	  
Knowledge	  of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   ASM	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	   specifically	   information	  on	   the	  
backgrounds	   of	   its	   participants,	   the	   breadth	   of	   technology	   now	   found	   at	   sites	   and	   the	  
organization	   of	   operations,	   has	   enhanced	   considerably	   since	   publication	   of	   what	   is	   now	  
regarded	  to	  be	  landmark	  paper	  on	  ASM	  by	  Siegel	  and	  Veiga	  (2009).	  	  Engaging	  with	  ideas	  put	  
forward	  by	  De	  Soto,	  the	  authors	  argued	  ‘that	  the	  key	  to	  alleviating	  poverty	  and	  preventing	  
conflict	   between	   the	  dual	   economies…is	   to	  expand	  property	   rights	   systems	   to	   absorb	   the	  
extra-­‐legal	  economy’	   (p.	  53).	   	  As	  a	   recipe	   for	   formalizing	  ASM,	   the	  authors’	  analysis	   could	  
quite	   easily	   have	   been	   dismissed	   as	   highly-­‐conceptual	   and	   idealistic	   at	   a	   time	   when,	   as	  
indicated,	  the	  debate	  focused	  squarely	  on	  individual	  operators.	  	  It	  is	  argued	  here,	  however,	  
that,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   where	   formalization	   of	   ASM	   is	   now	   garnering	  
considerable	  attention	  in	  regional	  development	  dialogues,	  plans	  and	  programs,	  the	  authors’	  
ideas	   and	   more	   broadly,	   those	   of	   De	   Soto,	   are	   in	   a	   position	   to	   wield	   influence	   in	  
policymaking	  circles.	  	  	  The	  heightened	  attention	  being	  paid	  to	  formalizing	  ASM	  in	  the	  region	  
has	   coincided	   with	   greater	   appreciation	   of	   the	   factors	   fueling	   the	   sector’s	   rapid,	   and	   at	  
times,	  unpredictable,	  growth,	  and	  the	  situations	  in	  which	  these	  apply,	  as	  well	  as	  generally,	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  the	  economic	  importance	  of	   its	  activities	  and	  ‘rootedness’	   in	  rural	  
areas,	  in	  particular,	  their	  links	  to	  subsistence	  agriculture.	  	  The	  expanded	  ASM	  agendas	  of	  the	  
World	  Bank,	  African	  Development	  Bank	  and	  United	  Nations	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Africa	  
(UNECA)	  are	  telling	  signs	  of	  growing	  donor	  interest	  in	  this	  subject.	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Verbrugge	   (2015)	   correctly	   points	   out	   how	  nuanced	  ASM	   informality	   can	  be,	   and	  how,	   in	  
many	  cases,	  the	  ‘fiscal,	  administrative	  and	  political	  barriers’	  which	  legalists	  such	  as	  De	  Soto	  
would	   argue	   prevent	   operators	   ‘from	   obtaining	   access	   to	   mineral-­‐bearing	   land	   through	  
existing	  formalization	  schemes’	  fail	  to	  explain	  fully	  the	  sector’s	  confinement	  to	  unregulated	  
spaces	  in	  certain	  countries	  (p.	  1024).	  	  But	  as	  naïve	  as	  it	  would	  be	  to	  assume	  that	  De	  Soto’s	  
solution	   to	   poverty	   –	   specifically,	   believing	   that	   the	   ‘asset-­‐less’	   poor’s	   informal	  
deeds/permits	  or	  so-­‐called	  ‘dead	  capital’	  can	  be	  readily	  converted	  to	  collateral	  which	  would	  
have	   immediate	   currency	   in	   the	   formal	   economy	   –	   is	   as	   straightforward	   as	   prescribed,	   it	  
would	   be	   equally	   premature	   to	   dismiss	   the	   ideas	   of	   his	   legalist	   camp	   altogether	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  ASM.	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  revisiting	  of	  De	  Soto	  could	  prove	  timely,	  given	  the	  impoverished	  
state	   of	   the	   ASM	   development	   agenda	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   at	   present,	   in	   particular,	   its	  
need	   for	  more	   effective	   formalization	   strategies.	   	   De	   Soto’s	   –	   at	   times,	   largely	   implicit	   –	  
ideas	  on	  how	  governments	  ‘create’	  informality	  have	  resonance	  here.	  	  A	  critical	  unpacking	  of	  
these	  ideas	  could	  yield	  strategies	  capable	  of	  bringing	  ‘order’	  to	  the	  region’s	  ASM	  economy.	  	  
Experiences	   from	   Ghana	   and	   Niger,	   two	   ASM	   landscapes	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   which	  
receive	   very	   different	   policy	   treatment,	   are	   used	   to	   illustrate	   both	   the	   value	   of	   adopting,	  
perhaps	   as	   a	   starting	   point,	   a	   legalist	   ‘lens’	   to	   study	   and	   respond	   to	   the	   nuances	   of	   the	  
sector’s	   persistent	   informality	   in	   the	   region,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   limitations	   of	   a	   formalization	  
strategy	  which	  solely	  seeks	  to	  transform	  ‘dead	  capital’	  into	  assets.	  	  
	  
	  
2. Formalizing	  Artisanal	  and	  Small-­‐Scale	  Mining:	  Resetting	  the	  Agenda	  
Before	   examining	   the	   case	   of	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   specifically,	   it	   is	   instructive	   to	   provide	   a	  
critical	  overview	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  question.	  	  As	  noted,	  in	  recent	  years,	  interest	  in	  formalizing	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ASM	  has	  risen	  rapidly.	  	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  World	  Bank	  in	  particular	  have	  embraced	  the	  
challenge,	  the	  former	  building	  on	  a	  series	  of	  disparate	  policy	  interventions	  made	  across	  its	  
many	  divisions	  over	  the	  past	  four	  decades	  and	  the	  latter	  making	  the	  subject	  a	  main	  focus	  of	  
its	  mining	  sector	  reform	  projects.	  	  	  
Initially,	   the	   response	   of	   governments	   to	   calls	   for	   giving	   greater	   priority	   to	  ASM	   issues	   in	  
policy	  (e.g.	  Davidson,	  1993;	  Kumar	  and	  Amaratunga,	  1994;	  Labonne,	  1994)	  was	  pedestrian.	  	  
The	   recent	   explosion	   of	   informal	   ASM	   activity	   in	   all	   corners	   of	   the	   developing	   world,	  
however,	  has	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	  donors,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  policymakers.	   	  Many	  are	  
now	  scrambling	  for	  new	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  bring	  the	  sector’s	  operations	  into	  the	  legal	  domain,	  
where,	   it	   is	   believed,	   they	   can	   be	   regulated,	   monitored	   and	   supported	  more	   effectively.	  	  
There	  is	  now	  a	  sizable	  literature	  on	  ASM	  formalization	  which	  could	  provide	  decision-­‐makers	  
with	   much-­‐needed	   guidance.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   studies	   that	   comprise	   this	   intriguing	  
body	  of	  analysis	  are,	   for	   the	  most	  part,	   insightful	  and	  engaging,	   sharing,	   inter	  alia,	  details	  
about	   the	   organizational	   structures	   of	   selected	   ASM	   activities	   and	   fresh	   ideas	   about	  why	  
operators	   choose	   to	   work	   in	   informal	   spaces.	   	   Notable	   examples	   include	   the	   work	   of	  
Verbrugge	  (2015)	  on	  the	  Philippines,	  Geenen	  (2012,	  2014)	  on	  the	  DR	  Congo,	  and	  Lahiri-­‐Dutt	  
(2012,	  2014)	  on	  India.	   	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	   is	  surprisingly	   little	  engagement	  here	  
with	  the	  overarching	  policy	  context.	  	  	  
This	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  weighs	  in	  on	  two	  significant	  points	  –	  1)	  the	  policy	  context,	  and	  2)	  
the	  causes	  of	   informality	  –	   to	  ensure	   that	   scholarly	  debates	  on	  ASM	  formalization	   remain	  
aligned	  with,	  and	  are	  best-­‐positioned	  to	  inform,	  the	  policy	  dialogue	  on	  the	  subject	  moving	  




2.1 The	  policy	  context	  
The	  importance	  of	  research	  which	  explores	  the	  formalization	  of	  the	  ASM	  sector	  remaining	  in	  
tune	  with	  the	  overarching	  policy	  dialogue,	  specifically	  its	  orientation	  and	  objectives,	  cannot	  
be	  overstated.	   	   	  The	  bulk	  of	  analysis	  produced	  thus	  far	  on	  the	  subject	  has	  not	  done	  so,	   its	  
most	  glaring	  shortcoming	  being	  a	  failure	  to	  disaggregate	  ‘mining	  titling’	  from	  other	  types	  of	  
property	  rights.	  	  This	  is	  significant,	  given	  the	  unique	  position	  ‘mining	  titling’	  occupies	  in	  the	  
policy	  frameworks	  of	  many	  developing	  countries	  in	  which	  resource	  extraction	  is	  now	  heavily	  
prioritized.	   Grouping	   it	   together	   with	   other	   property	   rights	   in	   critiques	   on	   access	   and	  
entitlement	  to	  land,	  therefore,	  could	  yield	  a	  convoluted	  and	  unrepresentative	  picture	  that	  is	  
heavily	  disconnected	  from	  the	  overarching	  policy	  dialogue	  and	  economic	  agendas	  of	  these	  
countries.	   	   A	   greater	   appreciation	   of,	   and	   continued	   focus	   on,	   the	   weight	   and	   influence	  
‘mining	  titling’	  carries	  in	  these	  settings	  is	  a	  key	  to	  producing	  scholarship	  that	  is	  aligned	  more	  
closely	  with	  the	  central	  development	  objectives	  of	  mineral-­‐rich	  economies.	  	  
This	  requires	  viewing	  the	  ‘exploitation/mining	  title’	  as	  ‘an	  immovable	  property	  right’	  which,	  
as	  Blanc	   (2015)	  explains,	   is	   ‘dually	  registered	  as	  a	  mining	  title	  and	  an	   immovable	  property	  
title’.	  	  Significantly,	  it	  ‘overrides	  rights	  that	  the	  land	  owner	  or	  other	  third	  parties	  may	  hold	  in	  
respect	  of	  the	  land	  surface	  covered	  by	  the	  mining	  title,	  such	  as	  farming,	  hunting,	  agricultural	  
rights,	   land	   occupation	   or	   even	   land	   ownership	   rights	   and	   easements	   that	   also	   qualify	   as	  
immovable	   property	   rights’	   (p.	   338).	   	   This	   is	   reflected	   very	   clearly	   in	   the	   legislation	   of	   a	  
number	  of	  developing	  countries.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  constitutions	  of	  both	  Kenya	  and	  Ghana	  
empower	  officials	  to	  exercise	   ‘the	  authority	  to	  acquire	  privately-­‐held	   land	   in	  a	  compulsory	  
manner’	   for	   the	   ‘purpose	   of	   conducting	   mineral	   operations’	   (Veit	   et	   al.,	   2013,	   p.	   3).	  	  
Similarly,	  in	  Ecuador,	  where	  oil	  extraction	  has	  become	  a	  focal	  point,	  economically,	  ‘the	  state	  
retains	  subsurface	  mineral	  rights	  on	  all	  land’,	  which	  means	  that	  ‘indigenous	  groups	  possess	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access	  and	  withdrawal	  rights	  to	  surface	  resources,	  while	  oil	  companies	  can	  lease	  subsurface	  
rights	   from	   the	   government’	   (Bremner	   and	   Lu,	   2006,	   p.	   508).	   	   In	   declaring	   the	   control	   of	  
minerals	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  interest,	  and	  establishing	  mining	  titles	  to	  facilitate	  extraction	  
and	  access	   to	   the	   lands	  which	   contain	  economic	  deposits,	   these,	   and	  other,	   governments	  
have	  managed	   to	   attract	   significant	   foreign	   investment.	   	  When	   this	   economic	  objective	   is	  
taken	   into	   consideration,	   discussions	   on	   formalizing	   other	   types	   of	   property	   rights	   (e.g.	  
Benjaminsen	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Sjaastad	   and	   Cousins,	   2008),	   although	   insightful	   and	   which	   no	  
doubt	  should	  feature	  much	  more	  prominently	  in	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  affecting	  mining	  
titles,	  become	  redundant.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  formalization	  of	  ASM	  –	  specifically,	   its	  embodiment	  within	  a	  reformed	  minerals	  policy	  
and	  regulatory	  apparatus,	  or,	  as	  Geenen	  (2012)	  puts	  it,	  ‘a	  standardized	  legal	  framework	  that	  
is	  registered	  in	  and	  governed	  by	  a	  central	  state	  system’	  –	  should	  be	  integral	  to	  any	  mining	  
titling	   process.	   	   In	   recent	   years,	   there	   has	   some	   been	   attention	   drawn	   to	   how,	   in	   some	  
countries,	   superimposed	   small-­‐scale	   mine	   registration	   systems	   overlap	   with	   statutory	  
and/or	  customary	  land	  rights.	  	  In	  such	  cases,	  explain	  Freudenberger	  et	  al.	  (2013),	  there	  are	  
pre-­‐existing	  land	  rights	  that	  may	  affect	  parcels	  of	   land	  which	  are	  ‘often	  exploited	  by	  many	  
other	   resource	   users	   like	   farmers,	   herders,	   and	   fishermen…[or]	   users	   [who]	   possess	   a	  
“bundle	   of	   rights”	   to	   the	   land:	   complex	   and	   overlapping	   rights	   to	   land,	   trees,	   and	  water	  
resources	  often	  derived	  from	  longheld	  historical	  claims’	  (p.	  4).	  	  Typically,	  the	  authors	  further	  
note,	   these	   systems	   are	   so	   robust	   that	   indigenous	   communities,	   superseding	   the	   law,	  
extract	   rents	   and	   other	   fees	   from	   incoming	   ASM	   operators,	   or	   ‘demand	   other	   forms	   of	  
compensation	   for	   the	   use	   of	   the	   land’	   (p.	   3).	   	   It	   is	   under	   such	   circumstances	   which,	   as	  
Geenen	   (2012)	   correctly	   points	   out,	   small-­‐scale	   miners	   will	   typically	   weigh	   the	   benefits	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against	  the	  costs	  of	  formalization,	  on	  which	  they	  base	  their	  decision	  to	  secure	  a	  title.	  	  This,	  
however,	  requires	  some	  explanation.	  
Indeed,	  as	  the	  author	  further	  explains,	  there	  have	  been	  countless	  situations	  in	  which	  miners	  
have	   elected	   not	   to	   formalize	   because	   of	   the	   costs	   and	   bureaucracy	   involved.	   	   For	   these	  
reasons,	  many	  choose	  not	  to	  pursue	  a	  mining	  title	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  license	  
or	   its	   equivalent	   –	   altogether,	   electing	   rather	   to	   operate	   under	   the	   direction	   of,	   and	   pay	  
taxes	   to,	   the	   indigenous	   communities	   which	   Freudenberger	   et	   al.	   (2013)	   claim	   are	  
‘superseding	   the	   law’.	   	  But	  what	  needs	  greater	  consideration	  here	   is	  why	   these	  situations	  
arise	   in	   the	   first	  place:	   specifically,	  why,	  despite	  mining	   titling	   trumping	  all	  other	   forms	  of	  
property	  rights	  in	  ‘reformed’	  landscapes,	  do	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  seem	  so	  
robust,	  and	  why	  are	  their	  leaders	  able	  to	  wield	  influence	  over	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  activities?	  	  
The	   answer	   lies	   in	   the	   policy	   treatment	   of	   ASM,	   a	   sector	   which,	   despite	   contributing	  
enormously	  to	  social	  and	  economic	  wellbeing	  in	  numerous	  poor	  areas	  of	  the	  globe,	  remains	  
unpopular	   with	   host	   governments.	   	   Nearly	   two	   decades	   ago,	   ILO	   officials	   hinted	   at	   how	  
‘reformed’	  mining	   economies	  had,	  what	   is	   referred	   to	  here,	   a	   large-­‐scale	   ‘bias’,	   reporting	  
that	  ‘If	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  is	  to	  be	  encouraged	  to	  operate	  legally	  [i.e.	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  formalized],	  
legislation	  must	  be	  (at	  least)	  even-­‐handed	  in	  allowing	  small-­‐scale	  miners	  access	  to	  suitable	  
land	  for	  prospecting	  and	  mining	  activities…–	  [that]	  permits…provide	  clear	  security	  of	  tenure	  
for	  a	  reasonable	  period	  so	  that	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  can	  become	  established’	  (np).	  	  	  
	  
This	  has	  meant	   that	   large-­‐scale	  mining	  activity,	   from	  which	   rent-­‐seeking	  governments	  can	  
extract	   taxes,	   royalties	   and	   licensing	   fees	  with	   relative	   ease,	   has	   been	  prioritized.	   	   At	   the	  
same	  time,	  failure	  to	  acknowledge	  ASM’s	   importance	  and	  generally,	  a	  poor	  understanding	  
of	  its	  dynamics,	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  bureaucratic	  and	  costly	  licensing	  systems	  (titles)	  which	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Geenen	   (2012)	   and	  others	   (e.g.	  Hilson	  and	  Potter,	   2005;	   Tschakert	   and	  Sinha,	  2007)	  have	  
argued	  quite	  persuasively	  impede	  the	  sector’s	  formalization.	  	  Cases	  in	  which	  customary	  land	  
rights	   ‘clash	  with	   those	   holding	   sub-­‐surface	   property	   rights’,	   therefore,	   should	   be	   viewed	  
less	  so	  as	  conflicts	  between	  the	  individuals	  found	  in	  and	  representing	  different	  systems,	  and	  
more	  so	  as	  the	  outcomes	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  ‘bias’,	  in	  this	  case,	  an	  incessant	  preoccupation	  with	  
operationalizing	   a	   blueprint	   which	   emphasizes	   bringing	   industrial-­‐scale	   capital-­‐intensive	  
mining	  to	  fruition	  (see	  Hilson,	  2017).	  	  	  
As	  a	  point	  of	  departure,	   it	   is	   instructive	   to	  revisit	  Siegel	  and	  Veiga	   (2009),	  who	  argue	  that	  
formalization	  of	  ASM	   should	  be	   viewed	  as	   ‘a	   process,	   not	   a	   product,	   and	   [how]	   even	   the	  
most	  elaborate	  policies	   to	   formalize	  mining	  activities	   fail	   if	   a	  government	   lacks	   the	  will	   to	  
implement	   these	  plans,	   if	  miners	  perceive	   licensing	  as	  a	   threat,	  or	   if	  miners	  cannot	  afford	  
the	   costs	   of	   joining	   the	   legal	   economy’	   (p.	   53).	   	   Given	   its	   low	   priority	   in	   ‘reformed’	  
landscapes,	   this	   ‘process’	   is	   as	  much	  about	   changing	  a	  policy	   ‘mind-­‐set’	   or	   culture	  as	   it	   is	  
about	  improving	  access	  to	  the	  relevant	  permits	  in	  settings	  in	  which	  ‘mining	  titling’	  trumps	  all	  
other	   property	   rights.	   	   This	   will	   require	   overhauling	   existing	   formalization	   frameworks,	  
which,	  as	  Verbrugge	  and	  Besmanos	  (2016)	  correctly	  point	  out,	  tend	  to	  make	  ‘assumptions	  
about	   a	   homogeneous	   ASM-­‐sector,	   thus	   glossing	   over	   the	   complex	   organizational	  
arrangements	  in	  a	  sector	  composed	  of	  an	  entire	  range	  of	  stakeholders’	  (p.	  135).	  	  If,	  indeed,	  
the	  formalization	  of	  ASM	  is	  a	  principal	  policy	  objective,	  then	  licensing	  schemes	  and	  support	  
structures	   must	   be	   implemented	   for	   the	   sector	   which	   adequately	   speak	   to	   the	  
heterogeneity	   of	   its	   workforce,	   a	   phenomenon	  which	   findings	   reported	   by	   Fisher	   (2007),	  
Verbrugge	  (2015),	  Verbrugge	  and	  Besmanos	  (2016)	  and	  others	  before	  them	  (e.g.	  Hentschel	  




2.2 Informality	  in	  ASM:	  The	  search	  for	  explanations	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  need	  for	  more	  nuanced	  explanations	  of	  ASM’s	  persistent	  informality.	  	  In	  an	  
effort	   to	   do	   so,	   attempts	   have	   been	   made	   to	   engage	   with	   the	   ideas	   underpinning	   the	  
various	  ‘schools’	  of	  informality	  which	  have	  emerged	  over	  the	  years.	  	  Chen	  et	  al.	  (2001),	  Chen	  
et	  al.,	  (2004)	  and	  Chen	  (2007,	  2012)	  summarize	  each:	  1)	  the	  dualists,	  who	  see	  the	  informal	  
sector	  as	  being	  comprised	  of	  marginal	  activities	  that	  provide	  a	  safety	  net	  for	  the	  poor	  and	  
are	   distinct	   from	   the	   formal	   economy;	   2)	   the	   structuralists,	  who	   see	   the	   former	   as	   being	  
subordinate	   to	   the	   latter;	   and	   3)	   the	   legalists,	   who	   view	   unregistered	   businesses	   as	   a	  
response	  by	  individuals	  to	  bureaucracy.	   	   In	  their	  efforts	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  
understanding	  of	  ASM’s	  persistent	  informality,	  scholars	  have	  drawn	  considerable	  inspiration	  
from	   these	   three	   schools.	   	   Considerable	   caution	  must	   be	   exercised	   here,	   however,	   given	  
that	  the	  ideas	  underpinning	  each	  were	  informed	  by	  sets	  of	  circumstances	  very	  different	  to	  
those	   facing	   ASM	   operators	   today:	   for	   the	   structuralists,	   the	   relationships	   between	  
household	   assistants	   and	   home	   owners	   in	   parts	   of	   Latin	   America	   (Portes	   and	   Shauffler,	  
1993);	   for	   the	   dualists,	   people	   taking	   on	   second	   and	   third	   jobs	   ‘off	   of	   the	   books’	   to	  
supplement	  their	  primary	  income,	  a	  phenomenon	  popularized	  by	  Hart	  (1973)	  in	  his	  seminal	  
paper	  on	  Nima,	  a	  neighbourhood	  in	  Ghana’s	  capital	  of	  Accra;	  and	  the	   legalists,	  such	  as	  De	  
Soto	  (2000,	  2002),	  who	  focus	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  marginalized	  masses	  in	  urban	  Peru.	  
	  
It	   would	   be	   naïve	   to	   assume,	   therefore,	   that	   these	   ideas	   are	   capable,	   on	   their	   own	   and	  
without	  refinement,	  of	  explaining	  fully	  the	  exceptionally	  unique	  and	  arguably	  more	  complex	  
‘brand’	  of	  informality	  that	  characterizes	  ASM	  today.	  	  The	  debates	  on	  informality	  that	  began	  
to	   galvanize	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s	   (Roitman,	   1990;	   Rauch,	   1991;	   Gupta,	   1993;	   Loayza,	  
1996;	   Chaudhuri,	   1989;	   Tokman,	   1989;	  Hemmer	   and	  Mannel,	   1989;	   Feige,	   1990)	   are	   also	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limited	   in	   their	   ability	   to	   explain	   certain	   phenomena	   in	   ASM.	   	   This	   body	   of	   analysis	   was	  
equally	   restricted	   in	   its	   outlook,	   focusing	  mostly	   on	   the	   economic	   impact	   of	   the	   informal	  
economy;	   was	   informed	   heavily	   by	   the	   experiences	   of	   urban	   dwellers,	   including	   their	  
interactions	   in	   the	   markets	   they	   frequent	   and	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   transactions;	   and	   was	  
undertaken	  mainly	  with	  a	  view	  to	  determining	  the	  amount	  of	  tax	  governments	  are	  missing	  
out	  on.	  	  Arguably,	  the	  ideas	  underpinning	  the	  three	  schools	  and	  those	  which	  are	  explored	  in	  
this	   body	   of	   literature	   are	   too	   crude	   to	   explain	   why	   informal	   ASM	   activities	   persist	  
worldwide.	  
But	  at	   the	  same	  time,	   to	  simply	  dismiss	   the	   ideas	  which	  underpin	   this	  body	  of	  analysis	  as	  
irrelevant	  would	  be	  equally	  premature.	  	  Many,	  with	  further	  refinement,	  could	  potentially	  go	  
a	   long	   way	   toward	   contextualizing	   phenomena	   observed	   in	   the	   informal	   ASM	   economy	  
which	   policymakers	   and	   donors	   have	   struggled	   to	   explain	   and	   respond	   to.	   	   Given	   ASM’s	  
unique	  attributes,	  a	  more	  dynamic	  framework	  built	  upon	  a	  range	  of	  ideas	  –	  including	  many	  
that	  underpin	  these	  schools	  –	  and	  which	  adequately	  speaks	  to	  the	  sector’s	  heterogeneity,	  is	  
desperately	  needed.	  	  This	  exercise	  becomes	  more	  focused	  and	  achievable	  when	  the	  grander	  
targets	   now	   enshrined	   in	   revised	   mineral	   legislation	   are	   considered.	   	   Specifically,	   and	  
building	   on	   points	   raised	   earlier,	   although	   efforts	   have	   been	  made	   across	   the	   developing	  
world	  to	  formalize	  ASM,	  the	  lack	  of	  priority	  the	  sector	  has	  been	  given	  in	  policy	  has	  stifled	  its	  
growth	   as	   a	   legalized	   entity.	   	   Revisiting	   points	   raised	   by	   Geenen	   (2012),	   the	   bureaucracy	  
that	  has	  emerged	  has,	  as	  Hilson	  (2013)	  puts	   it,	  been	  heavily	  responsible	   for	   ‘creating’	  and	  
sustaining	  informality	  in	  the	  sector,	  or,	  more	  precisely,	  spawning	  the	  policy	  frameworks	  and	  
spaces	  which	  have	  nurtured	  its	  growth.	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Scholars	  who	   have	   failed	   to	   take	   stock	   of	   the	   overarching	   policy	   context	   have	   tended	   to	  
produce	   work	   which	   is	   incapable	   of	   guiding	   donors	   and	   policymakers	   through	   the	   ASM	  
formalization	  process.	  	  One	  such	  example	  is	  Lahiri-­‐Dutt	  (2014).	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  author	  
rightly	   argues	   that	   the	   ‘absolute	   ownership	   of	   the	   state	   over	   all	   resources	   is	   the	   primary	  
basis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  eminent	  domain’,	  which	  means	  it	  ‘can	  then	  allow,	  based	  on	  human	  
right	   licenses,	   private	   entities	   such	   as	   corporations	   to	   exercise	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   access	  
these	  resources’	  (p.	  10).	  	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  a	  crucial	  point	  which	  is	  not	  mentioned,	  
this	   titling	   exercise	   should	   also	   extend	   to	   ASM.	   	   It	   is,	   once	   again,	   a	   powerful	   large-­‐scale	  
mining	   ‘bias’,	  or,	   as	   ILO	  officials	  put	   it,	   legislation	  not	  being	   ‘even-­‐handed’,	   that	  has	  been	  
responsible	  for	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  ASM	  in	  the	  informal	  economy.	  	  Ironically,	  the	  author’s	  
decision	   to	   use	   the	   phrase	   ‘extractive	   peasants’	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘small-­‐scale	   miners’	   does	  
connote	  the	  resulting	  marginalization.	  	  The	  author,	  preoccupied	  with	  exploring	  how	  ‘mining	  
by	  peasants	  can	  potentially	  reconfigure	  two	  areas	  of	  scholarship,	  labour	  studies	  and	  peasant	  
studies’	   (p.	   7),	   consequently	   implies	   that	   those	   engaged	   in	   ASM	   are	   exclusively	   ‘former	  
peasants	  who	  are	  incorporated	  into	  mineral	  extractive	  occupations	  that	  can	  generate	  cash	  
for	  subsistence	  people’	  (p.	  6).	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  is	  no	  reference	  made	  to	  the	  sector’s	  
policy	   treatment,	   specifically,	   how,	   if	   ‘even	  handed’,	   the	   ‘absolute	  ownership	  of	   the	   state	  
over	  all	  resources’	  would	  yield	  mining	  titles	  which	  could	  empower	  and	  ultimately	  safeguard	  
the	  livelihoods	  and	  formalize	  the	  activities	  of	  these	  ‘extractive	  peasants’.	  	  
	  
Analysis	   presented	   by	   Tschakert	   (2016),	   however,	   perhaps	   best	   captures	   how	   unfocused	  
scholarship	   on	   the	   formalization	   of	   ASM	   has	   become.	   	   The	   author	   synthesizes	   public	  
perceptions	   of	   the	   thousands	   of	   Chinese	   ‘gold	   seekers’	   now	   found	   in	   Ghana’s	   informal	  
artisanal	  mining	   sector,	   claiming	   that	   these	   individuals	   ‘have	   replaced	   the	   local	  diggers	  as	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the	  vilified	  group	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  pecking	  order	  that	  stereotyped	  the	  deviant	  Other’	  (p.	  
124).	  	  But	  the	  far	  greater	  concern	  here,	  which	  the	  author	  cavalierly	  dismisses,	  is	  why	  these	  
individuals	  are	  there	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  This	  development,	  Hilson	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  argue,	  is	  the	  
latest	  ‘expression’	  of	  the	  sector’s	  informality,	  the	  growing	  masses	  of	  Chinese	  minersa	  result	  
of	   local	   operators,	   struggling	   to	   secure	   licenses	   and	   finance	   for	   their	   activities,	   having	  
reached	   out	   to	   investors	   in	   the	   Far	   East.	   	   Disconnected	   from	   the	   policy	   dialogue	   on	  
formalization,	   Tschakert	   (2016)	   seems	   to	   have	   overlooked	   this,	   leading	   to	   a	   drawn-­‐out	  
analysis	   of	   the	   vilification	   of	   Chinese	  miners	   in	   Ghana,	   a	   superfluous	   issue	   in	   virtually	   all	  
debates	   on	   formalization	   and	   support	   of	   the	   country’s	   ASM	   sector.	   	   The	   author	   also	  
inexplicably	   accuses	   Hilson	   et	   al.	   (2014)	   of	   providing	   a	   ‘superficial	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
state’s	  response	  to	  dealing	  with	  the	  mushrooming	  Chinese	  presence	  and	  growing	  influence	  
in	  Ghana’s	  ASM	  sector	  obscures	  the	  power	  dynamics	  that	  made	  this	  spectacle	  performance	  
and	  enactment	  of	  social	  exclusion	  possible’	  (p.	  124),	  despite	  this	  not	  being	  the	  objective	  of	  
their	  paper.	  	  Interestingly	  and	  contrary	  to	  these	  claims,	  in	  explaining	  how	  the	  Government	  
of	  Ghana	  has	  ‘informalized’	  ASM,	  Hilson	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  do	  provide	  evidence	  of	  precisely	  how	  
‘uneven’	  policy	  and	  legislation	  has	  exposed	  these	  ‘power	  dynamics	  that	  made	  this	  spectacle	  
performance	  and	  enactment	  of	  social	  exclusion	  possible’.	  
	  
To	  summarize,	  if,	  indeed,	  the	  goal	  is	  formalization	  –	  that	  is,	  to	  bring	  operators	  into	  the	  legal	  
domain	   –	   then	   ‘mining	   titling’	   for	   ASM	   must	   be	   a	   flexible	   and	   empowering	   process,	  
responding	  to	  the	  heterogeneity	  which	  Verbrugge	  (2015)	  and	  others	  describe.	  	  This	  will	  first	  
require	  systematically	  unpacking,	  revisiting	  and	  refining	  debates	  and	  ideas	  on	  informality	  in	  
which	  complex	  economic	  sectors	  such	  as	  ASM	  have	  not	  yet	  featured.	  	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  case	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of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  helps	  to	  bridge	  this	  gap,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  
refocusing	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  formalization	  of	  ASM.	  
	  
3. Formalizing	   Artisanal	   and	   Small-­‐Scale	   Mining	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa:	   Initial	  
Reflections	  
The	  literature	  is	  replete	  with	  assessments	  of	  the	  burgeoning	  informal	  economy	  now	  rooted	  
in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa.	   	   Although	   most	   of	   its	   countries	   ‘either	   don’t	   collect	   data	   on	   the	  
informal	   sector	   or…use	   different	   definitions’	   (Verick,	   2004,	   p.	   6),	   it	   has	   not	   prevented	  
scholars	  from	  drawing	  conclusions	  from	  what	  little	  information	  is	  available.	  	  There	  is	  broad	  
agreement	   that	   the	   region’s	   endemic	   poverty	   and	   its	   struggle	   to	   generate	   consistent	  
economic	   growth	   has	   influenced	   the	   dynamics	   of	   its	   labour	   and	   employment	   structures	  
dramatically,	  in	  the	  process	  moulding	  its	  informal	  sector	  (ILO,	  2009).	  	  This,	  according	  to	  the	  
literature,	   has	   been	   fueled	   heavily	   by	   the	   sweeping	   changes	   made	   under	   structural	  
adjustment,	  including	  a	  devaluation	  of	  currencies,	  removal	  of	  tariffs	  and	  subsidies,	  a	  ‘rolling	  
back’	  of	  the	  state,	  mass	  privatization	  and	  a	  dismantling	  of	  public	  services,	  which	  have	  been	  
responsible	  for	  numerous	  redundancies	  and	  causing	  the	  labour	  force	  to	  contract	  markedly	  
(Crisp	   and	   Kelly,	   1999;	   Pegg,	   2003).	   	   According	   to	   data	   compiled	   by	   Chen	   (2001),	   in	   the	  
1990s,	   93	  percent	  of	  new	   jobs	   created	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  were	   in	   the	   informal	   sector.	  	  
Today,	   most	   (>80	   percent)	   of	   those	   who	   are	   engaged	   in	   informal	   sector	   activities	   in	   the	  
region	   are	   self-­‐employed,	   poverty-­‐driven,	   have	   low	   levels	   of	   education	   and	   are	   generally	  
involved	  in	  trade-­‐related	  activities	  (Verick,	  2004;	  ILO,	  2009).	  	  	  	  	  	  
Curiously,	  although	  the	  boundaries	  of	   the	  ASM	  sector	   in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  also	  began	  to	  
take	  shape	  under	  structural	  adjustment,	  it	  has	  been	  overlooked	  in	  most	  assessments	  of	  the	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region’s	  informal	  sector.	  	  Today,	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  the	  small-­‐scale	  miners	  operating	  in	  
sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  are	   in	  possession	  of	   the	  requisite	  permits,	  which	   is	  why,	   from	  Uganda,	  
through	  DR	  Congo,	   to	  Ghana,	   the	   formalization	  of	   their	   operations	  has	  become	  a	  priority	  
concern	  for	  donors	  and	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  region’s	  policymakers.	  	  The	  rapid	  proliferation	  
of	   unlicensed	   activities	   has	   often	   interfered	   with	   the	   more	   grandiose	   plans	   of	   host	  
governments	   to	   attract	   foreign	   investment	   in	   large-­‐scale	   agricultural	   and	   resource	  
extraction	  projects.	   	  The	  problem,	  however,	   is	   that	  government	  officials,	  donors	  and	  NGO	  
officers	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  solely	  upon	  ASM’s	  environmental	  and	  social	  impacts	  –	  namely,	  
the	  many	   ‘expressions’	   of	   the	   sector’s	   informality	   –	   as	   opposed	   to	   asking	  why	   it	   is	   in	   the	  
state	  it	  is	  and	  how	  these	  have	  come	  about	  and	  more	  broadly,	  why	  the	  sector	  is	  progressing	  
along	  the	  development	  trajectory	  it	  is.	  
Although	  the	  enthusiasm	  over	  De	  Soto’s	   ideas	  has	  understandably	  waned,	  they	  do	  help	  to	  
explain,	   at	   least	   in	  part,	  why,	   across	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  most	  ASM	  activities	  are	   found	   in	  
informal	   spaces.	   	   It	   is	   not,	   however,	   the	   author’s	   core	   thesis	   on	   the	   activation	   of	   ‘dead	  
capital’	   as	   an	   empowerment	   strategy	   for	   the	   poor	   which	   the	   discussion	   that	   follows	  
embraces.	   	   It	   is	   rather	   the	   ancillary	   analysis	   which	   appear	   in	   his	   texts	   and	   their	  
underpinnings,	   as	   well	   as	   his	   implicit	   –	   or	   perhaps	   even	   unintentional	   –	   criticisms	   of	   the	  
state	   that	   have	   application	   to	   debates	   on	   ASM	   informality	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa.	   	  When	  
fused,	   these	   ideas	  provide	   a	   framework	   for	   understanding	  why	   informality	   persists	   in	   the	  
region’s	   ASM	   economy,	   and	   ultimately,	   which	   steps	   must	   be	   taken	   to	   legalize	   activities.	  	  
Three	  elements	  in	  particular	  have	  application	  here,	  each	  of	  which	  will	  be	  briefly	  examined	  in	  
turn:	  1)	  how,	   in	   line	  with	  the	   ILO	  (1999),	  Hilson	  (2013)	  and	  Hilson	  et	  al.	   (2014),	  policy	  has	  
‘created’	  informality	  in	  the	  ASM	  sector	  and	  continues	  to	  do	  so;	  2)	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  drive	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to	   formalize;	  and	  3)	   the	  entrepreneurial	   spirit	  of	  operators.	   	   Following	   this	  analysis,	   these	  
issues	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  greater	  depth,	  drawing	  on	  the	  cases	  of	  Ghana	  and	  Niger.	  
	  
3.1 ‘Creating’	  Informality	  
De	  Soto’s	   thesis	   is	  straightforward:	   that	   the	  world’s	  poor	  hold	  trillions	  of	  dollars	   in	  assets,	  
which	   are	   not	   recognized	   outside	   of	   the	   small,	   ‘extra-­‐legal’	   circles	   in	   which	   they	   mostly	  
operate.	   	   If	   this	   ‘dead	   capital’	  was	   formally	   recognized,	   he	  maintains,	   it	   could	   be	  used	   as	  
collateral	  and	  for	  trade	  and	  therefore,	  could	  have	  a	  transformative	  effect	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  
marginalized	   masses.	   	   Because	   of	   their	   simplicity	   and	   conciseness,	   De	   Soto’s	   views	   have	  
been	   embraced	   by	   development	   agencies	   ‘across	   the	   political	   spectrum’,	   from	   the	   ‘neo-­‐
liberal	   USAID	   and	   World	   Bank,	   to	   social	   democrat	   Nordic	   governments	   spearheading	   a	  
property	   rights	   reform	   agenda	   in	   the	   UN	   Economic	   Commission	   for	   Europe’	   (Nyamu-­‐
Musembi,	  2006,	  p.	  7;	  see	  also	  Kingwill	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Nyamu-­‐Musembi,	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  
But	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   author	   has	   had	   his	   share	   of	   detractors.	   Criticisms	   of	   his	   work	  
continue	  to	  mount:	  about	  his	  property-­‐titling	  project	  being	  flawed;	  how	  his	  argument	  that	  
the	  formalization	  of	  land	  ownership	  facilitates	  access	  to	  credit	  and	  improved	  productivity	  is	  
untrue;	  and	  that	  his	  policy	  recommendations	  are	  case-­‐specific.	  	  In	  fact,	  aside	  from	  the	  ‘core’	  
macro	   development	   thinkers,	   including	   Ronald	   Coase,	   Jagdish	   Bhagwati	   and	   Milton	  
Friedman,	  praise	  for	  De	  Soto’s	  ideas	  has	  been	  virtually	  non-­‐existent	  (Ahiakpor,	  2008).	  	  Even	  
his	  mining-­‐related	  example	  of	  the	  1849	  California	  Gold	  Rush,	  despite	  resonating	  powerfully	  
with	  Siegel	  and	  Veiga	  (2009),	  is	  difficult	  to	  justify.	  	  De	  Soto	  drew	  attention	  to	  how,	  following	  
the	   gold	   rush,	   there	   were	   800	   separate	   property	   systems,	   each	   with	   its	   own	   system	   of	  
governance.	  	  For	  the	  1872	  Mining	  Act	  to	  have	  ‘legitimacy’,	  argue	  Siegel	  and	  Veiga	  (2009),	  it	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‘had	   to	   adapt	   to	   the	   social	   contracts	   created	   by	   these	   informal	   property	   rights	   systems’,	  
taking	   stock	   of	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   ‘hundreds	   of	   extra-­‐legal	   local	   and	   regional	   claim	  
associations	   with	   elaborate	   regulations	   for	   marking	   territories,	   registering	   claims,	   and	  
administering	   justice’	   (p.	  53).	   	  But	  whilst	  such	  a	   ‘bottom-­‐up’	  approach	  would	  undoubtedly	  
yield	  more	  representative	  policy	  and	  regulatory	  frameworks	  for	  ASM	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  
the	  current	  political	  climate	  and	  focus	  of	  the	  region’s	  extractive	  industries	  agenda	  make	  this	  
challenging	  –	  a	  point	  which	  will	  be	  elaborated	  on	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper.	  
The	  bulk	  of	  criticism	  directed	  at	  De	  Soto	  concerns	  the	  efficacy	  of	  his	  recommendations.	  	  As	  
his	   detractors	   have	   rightly	   hinted,	   the	   path	   to	   wealth	   creation,	   particularly	   for	   the	  
marginalized,	  is	  not	  straightforward,	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  permits	  and	  titles	  are	  recognized	  
by	   the	   state	   (Kingwell	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Nyamu-­‐Musembi,	   2006).	   	   But	  when	  used	  as	   a	   lens	   for	  
exploring	  how	  states	  potentially	  create	  informality,	  De	  Soto’s	  ideas	  have	  resonance,	  at	  least	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  ASM	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  In	  fact,	  this	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  main	  point	  he	  was	  
making	   in	   his	   own	  writings	   about	   Peru:	   how,	   inter	   alia,	   it	   took	   up	   to	   289	  days	   to	   open	   a	  
business	   in	   Lima;	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   a	   legal	   title	   for	   a	   piece	   of	   land,	   completions	   of	   728	  
administrative	   steps	  were	   needed;	   and	   it	   took	   seven	   years,	   and	   297	   administrative	   steps	  
and	  inputs	  from	  52	  government	  offices	  to	  construct	  a	  house	  on	  state-­‐owned	  land	  (De	  Soto,	  
2002).	  	  	  
In	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   ASM	   has	   suffered	   the	   same	   fate.	   	   Its	   first	   wave	   of	   mining	   sector	  
reformers	   (Campbell,	   2002),	   headed	   by	   Ghana,	   intentionally	   ‘sidelined’	   the	   needs	   of	  
artisanal	  and	  small-­‐scale	  operators	  in	  a	  bid	  to	  create	  a	  space	  for	  foreign-­‐financed	  export-­‐led	  
large-­‐scale	   extraction.	   	   The	   World	   Bank,	   the	   chief	   architect	   of	   mining	   sector	   reform,	  
19	  
	  
rationalized	   this	   large-­‐scale	   ‘bias’	   in	   its	   landmark	   report,	   A	   Strategy	   for	   African	   Mining	  
(World	  Bank,	  1992):	  	  
There	   is	   no	   good	   reason	   to	   create	   differential	   access	   to	  mineral	   rights	   for	   different	  
classes	   of	   mining	   investor.	   A	   state	   mining	   enterprise	   should	   compete	   on	   the	   same	  
terms	   as	   a	   privately-­‐owned	   company,	   foreign	   on	   the	   same	   terms	   as	   national,	   large	  
companies	  under	  the	  same	  broad	  rules	  as	  small	  ones.	  [p.	  22]	  
	  
Most	  countries	   in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  had,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   implemented	  laws	  and	  policy	  
frameworks	  (or	  were	  in	  the	  process	  of	  designing	  them)	  for	  ASM	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  formalizing	  
its	  activities	  (Fisher,	  2007).	  	  But	  without	  a	  clear	  idea	  about	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  individuals	  being	  
targeted	  and	   the	  changing	  dynamics	  of	   their	  activities,	  a	  policy	  disconnect	  was	   inevitable.	  	  
Davidson	   (1993)	   was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   oversight,	   stressing	   the	  
importance	   of	   creating	   a	   space	   for	   a	   formalized	   ASM	   economy	   to	   flourish.	   	   The	   author	  
argued	   that	   ‘Governments	  must	   be	   prepared	   to	  move	   beyond	   the	   establishment	   of	   legal	  
frameworks,	  to	  identify	  deposits	  and	  areas	  amenable	  to	  small-­‐scale	  development,	  including	  
the	   preliminary	   evaluation	   of	   their	   technical	   and	   economic	   viability	   at	   different	   levels	   of	  
operation’	  (p.	  317).	  	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  the	  situation	  had	  become	  quite	  problematic,	  
so	   much	   so	   that	   ILO	   officials	   declared	   that	   ASM	   was	   ‘[now]	   bedevilled	   with	   too	   many	  
regulations	  that	  are	  mostly	  designed	  to	  constrain	   it	  and	  too	  few	   inspectors	  to	  ensure	  that	  
they	  do’	  (ILO,	  1999,	  np).	  	  	  
In	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  there	  have	  since	  been	  countless	  examples	  cited	  which	  point	  to	  how	  
governments	  are	  ‘creating’	  informality	  in	  the	  sector	  through	  bureaucracy	  and	  costs,	  similar	  
to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   De	   Soto	   described	   what	   was	   happening	   in	   Peru	   and	   how	   its	   policy	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apparatus	   was	   fueling	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   country’s	   ‘extra-­‐legal’	   economy.	   	   In	   Ghana,	   for	  
example,	  as	  numerous	  scholars	   (e.g.	  Hilson	  and	  Potter,	  2005;	  Tschakert	  and	  Singha,	  2007)	  
have	  highlighted	  over	  the	  past	  15	  years,	  miners	  have	  repeatedly	  complained	  to	  government	  
officials	   about	   the	   fees	   for	   a	   license	   and	   an	   environmental	   permit,	   which	  most	  maintain	  
have	  kept	  them	  in	  the	   informal	  economy.	   	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  Zimbabwe,	  where	  a	  costly	  
environmental	   impact	   assessment,	   reportedly	   in	   the	   range	   of	   US$4000	   in	   2009,	   is	   also	  
impeding	   the	   formalization	   of	   ASM	   (Spiegel,	   2015),	   and	   in	   the	   Central	   African	   Republic,	  
where	  ‘artisanal	  miners	  still	  face	  barriers	  in	  purchasing	  an	  annual	  license	  (patente)	  for	  $100’	  
and	   ‘likely	   also	   face	   even	   more	   difficulties	   due	   to	   additional	   taxes,	   royalties,	   rents,	   and	  
bureaucracy’	  (Hinton	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  Even	  in	  the	  most	  desperate	  of	  situations,	  such	  as	  Liberia,	  
the	  government	  continues	  to	  charge	  fees	  for	  licenses	  and	  permits	  that	  are	  well	  beyond	  the	  
financial	  means	  of	  most	  operators	  (Van	  Bockstael,	  2014).	  	  	  
In	   these,	   and	   other,	   African	   countries,	   in	   response	   to	   complaints	   about	   costs	   and	   the	  
bureaucracy,	   governments	   have	   tended	   to	   make	   it	   even	   more	   difficult	   for	   prospective	  
licensees.	   	  As	   is	  explained	   in	   the	  next	  section	  of	   the	  paper,	   this	   is	  chiefly	  a	   result	  of	   there	  
being	  no	  incentive	  for	  governments	  to	  respond	  to	  miners’	  criticisms	  in	  a	  systematic	  manner.	  	  
For	  legalists	  such	  as	  De	  Soto,	  individuals	  will	  continue	  to	  operate	  in	  informal	  spaces	  as	  long	  
as	  government	  procedures	  remain	  cumbersome	  and	  costly	  (Chen	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  This	  seems	  
to	  apply	  to	  ASM	  across	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
3.2 Political	  Drive	  
The	   ‘transition	   to	   formality’,	   explain	   ILO	   officials,	   ‘calls	   for	   the	   development	   of	   a	  
comprehensive	  and	  integrated	  strategy	  cutting	  across	  a	  range	  of	  policy	  areas	  that	  eliminates	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the	  negative	  aspects	  of	  informality	  while	  preserving	  the	  significant	  job-­‐creation	  and	  income-­‐
generation	   potential	   of	   the	   informal	   economy,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   promotes	   the	  
protection	   and	   incorporation	   of	   informal	   economy	   workers	   and	   economic	   units	   into	   the	  
mainstream	  economy’	  (ILO,	  2009,	  p.	  iii).	  	  As	  noted	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  article,	  for	  decades,	  
the	  case	  made	  for	  formalizing	  ASM	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  operator,	  which,	  
unsurprisingly,	  has	  had	  little	  effect.	  	  	  
The	   analysis	   put	   forward	   by	   Siegel	   and	   Veiga	   (2009)	   also	   focuses	   on	   the	   operator.	   	   They	  
argue	  that:	  
In	  theory,	  formalization	  provides	  miners	  two	  forms	  of	  stability.	  First,	  it	  allows	  them	  to	  
predict	  their	  taxation	  rather	  than	  having	  to	  pay	  the	  hidden	  cost	  of	  bribes;	  and	  second,	  
it	  reduces	  stress	  over	  the	  cost	  of	  rebuilding	  after	  military	  actions	  taken	  against	  them.	  
[p.	  52]	  
Without	   the	   full	   commitment	   of	   politicians,	   however,	   widespread	   ASM	   formalization	   will	  
never	  be	  achieved,	  even	  where	  ‘mining	  titling’	  is	  identified	  as	  a	  priority.	  	  Whilst	  the	  rhetoric	  
of	  donors	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  host	  African	  governments,	  may	  suggest	  otherwise,	  overall,	  
the	  interventions	  made	  to	  date	  to	  bring	  ASM	  operators	  into	  the	  legal	  domain	  have	  been	  ad	  
hoc,	  lacking	  the	  necessary	  ‘buy	  in’	  to	  make	  a	  noticeable	  impact	  in	  landscapes	  where	  again,	  
the	   expansion	   of	   export-­‐led	   large-­‐scale	   resource	   extraction	   has	   been	   prioritized.	   	   For	   the	  
Government	   of	   Peru,	   the	   turning	   point	   proved	   to	   be	   the	   president’s	   recognition	   of	   the	  
threat	   posed	   by	   the	   terrorist	   organization,	   Sendero	   Luminoso,	   specifically,	   fears	   of	   its	  
growing	   influence	  over	   the	   excluded	  poor	  masses.	   	  De	   Soto	   later	   reflected	  on	   the	   events	  
leading	  up	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  take	  action:	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I	  explained	  to	  the	  president	  [Fernando	  Terry]	  that	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  Peruvians	  worked	  
outside	   the	   law–in	   the	   extra-­‐legal	   sector–the	   inescapable	   conclusion	   was	   that	   the	  
nation’s	  people	  viewed	  the	  law,	  and	  the	  government	  that	  was	  trying	  to	  enforce	  it,	  as	  
hostile	   to	   their	   interests.	   	   If	   he	   wanted	   Peruvians	   to	   avoid	   the	   temptations	   of	   the	  
terrorists,	  he	  would	  have	  to	  show	  the	  people	  that	  working	  within	  the	  law	  was	  in	  their	  
interest…due	  to	  bad	  law,	  the	  poor	  were	  facing	  huge	  entry	  and	  operational	  costs	  and	  
were	  missing	   some	  of	   the	  crucial	   institutions	  needed	   to	  create	  prosperity.	   [De	  Soto,	  
2002,	  p.	  xxii]	  
This	  prompted	  a	  systematic	  review	  of	  the	  bureaucracy	   inhibiting	  the	  formalization	  of	  poor	  
entrepreneurs;	   a	   revision	   of	   laws	   and	   policies,	   their	   redesign	   informed	   heavily	   by	   the	  
dynamics	   of	   the	   extant	   ‘extra-­‐legal’	   economy;	   and	   the	   installation	   of	   an	   ombudsman	   to	  
‘connect’	  with	  the	  impoverished	  masses.	  	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  activate	  the	  poor’s	  ‘dead	  capital’,	  
arming	  them	  with	  the	  assets	  needed	  to	  legitimize	  themselves	  and	  grow	  as	  entrepreneurs.	  
Although	  an	  equivalent	  policy	  overhaul	  has	  yet	  to	  take	  place	  for	  ASM	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  
the	   case	   for	   formalizing	   the	   sector	   in	   the	   region,	   though	  at	   times	  unfocused,	   is	   gathering	  
momentum,	  largely	  because	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  an	  issue	  which	  only	  affects	  a	  small	  group	  
of	   individuals.	   	   The	   subject	   is	   rather	   increasingly	   being	   viewed	   and	   approached	   as	   a	  
multifaceted	  development	  challenge,	  one	  which	  will	  require	  the	  commitment	  of,	  and	  inputs	  
from,	   a	   range	   of	   institutional	   actors	   if	   it	   is	   to	   be	   addressed	   effectively.	   	   There	   are	   three	  
obvious	   reasons	   why	   ASM	   formalization	   is	   rapidly	   gaining	   traction	   on	   the	   region’s	  
development	  agenda,	  the	  first	  being	  recognition	  that	  the	  sector	  is	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  
the	   rural	   economy,	   in	   particular,	   and	   as	   indicated,	   that	   it	   has	   inseparable	   linkages	   with	  
agriculture.	   	   As	   countless	   studies	   have	   shown	   (see	   e.g.	   Maconachie	   and	   Binns,	   2007;	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Dondeyne	   and	   Ndunguru,	   2014;	   Kelly,	   2014),	   throughout	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   millions	   of	  
families	  engage	  seasonally	  or	  simultaneously	  in	  both	  economic	  activities.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  it	  is	  
the	  money	  generated	  from	  ASM	  that	  is	  being	  used	  to	  finance	  smallholder	  activities,	  which,	  
under	  structural	  adjustment,	  have	  become	   less	  viable	  economically	  due	  to	   the	  removal	  of	  
subsidies	   on	   crucial	   farm	   inputs	   such	   as	   fertilizers	   and	   the	   dismantling	   of	   government	  
support	  services	   (Banchirigah	  and	  Hilson,	  2010).	   	  Given	  this	   interconnectedness,	  a	   ‘siloing’	  
and	   individual	   treatment	   of	   each	   sector	   in	   policy	   is	   no	   longer	   an	   option:	  with	   individuals	  
engaging	   in	   both	   activities,	   the	   strategy	  moving	   forward	  must	   be	   a	  more	   comprehensive	  
treatment	  of	  ‘rural	  livelihoods’	  and/or	  ‘rural	  household	  needs’.	  	  	  
The	  second	  reason	  is	  growing	  recognition	  of	  the	  link	  between	  ASM’s	  growth	  and	  structural	  
adjustment.	  	  For	  decades,	  ASM	  has	  been	  labelled	  a	  ‘poverty-­‐driven	  activity’,	  undertaken	  by	  
people	  who	  have	   few,	   if	   any,	  employment	  alternatives.	   	   It	  was	   following	   the	  World	  Bank-­‐
hosted	  International	  Roundtable	  on	  Artisanal	  Mining	  in	  1995,	  where	  attendees	  agreed	  that	  
‘to	   a	   large	   extent,	   informal	   mining	   is	   a	   poverty-­‐driven	   activity’	   and	   there	   was	   some	  
‘discussion	   about	   some	  operators	   potentially	   being	   trapped	   in	   a	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   poverty’,	  
that	  the	  idea	  began	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  donor	  and	  policymaking	  circles	  (Barry,	  1996,	  p.	  1).	  	  The	  
dialogue	  which	   followed,	   explains	   Jennings	   (2003),	  would	   prove	   significant	   because	   ‘Until	  
the	  link	  between	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  and	  poverty	  was	  highlighted	  in	  the	  late-­‐1990s’,	  the	  ASM	  
sector	  ‘was	  just	  not	  high	  enough	  on	  the	  agendas	  of	  governments	  and	  international	  donors	  
to	   attract	   widespread,	   and	   sustained,	   attention’	   (p.	   146).	   	   The	   link	   between	   structural	  
adjustment,	   poverty	   and	   the	   growth	   of	   informal	   ASM	   activity	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   soon	  
became	  clear.	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Officials	   at	   UNECA	  were	   quick	   to	   popularize	   this,	   highlighting,	   in	   a	   landmark	   report,	   how	  
‘Increasing	  numbers	  of	  people	  have	  turned	  to	  SSM	  [small-­‐scale	  mining]	  to	  seek	  alternative	  
livelihoods’,	  which,	  ‘In	  many	  cases…was	  impelled	  by	  growing	  economic	  crises,	  the	  effects	  of	  
structural	   adjustment,	   particularly	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  which	   increased	   unemployment,	  
mine	   redundancies	   in	   large	   mine	   companies	   due	   to	   crumbling	   mineral	   prices,	   and	  
decreasing	  rural	  livelihood	  choices,	  chiefly	  in	  areas	  affected	  by	  natural	  (mainly	  droughts	  and	  
floods)	  and	  man-­‐made	  disasters’	  (UNECA,	  2003,	  p.	  2).	   	   	  Banchirigah	  (2006)	  pulled	  together	  
case	   study	   analysis	   from	   several	   countries	   to	   reinforce	   these	   points	   further.	   	   This,	   and	  
complementary,	  analysis	  has	  sought	  to	  draw	  the	  attention	  of	  policymakers	  to	  the	  growing	  
economic	   importance	   of	   ASM	   in	   a	   landscape	   devoid	   of	   employment	   alternatives	   (e.g.	  
Maconachie	  and	  Binns,	   2007;	  Kelly,	   2014).	   	   Studies	   conducted	  over	   the	  past	  decade	  have	  
repeatedly	   shown	   that	   large	  numbers	   of	   people	   from	  all	   segments	   of	  African	   society	   are,	  
indeed,	  moving	   into	   the	  sector	  because	  of	  poverty	   (UNECA,	  2003;	  Banchirigah	  and	  Hilson,	  
2010).	   	   The	   region’s	   policymakers	   appear	   to	   be	   slowly	   recognizing	   the	   value	   of	   ASM	   in	  
poverty-­‐stricken	  landscapes,	  in	  particular	  how	  it	  is	  alleviating	  the	  hardships	  of	  many	  people,	  
and	  engaging	  potentially-­‐volatile	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  youth	  (Hilson	  and	  Osei,	  2014).	  	  	  	  	  
This	   leads	   to	   the	   third	   and	   final	   reason,	   which	   is	   the	   growing	   realization	   in	   donor	   and	  
policymaking	  circles	  that	   it	   is	  no	   longer	  viable	  for	  ASM	  to	  take	  a	   ‘back	  seat’	  under	  reform.	  	  
After	  taking	  stock	  of	  experiences	  of	  Ghana	  and	  Tanzania,	  two	  of	  the	  more	  ‘mature’	  mining	  
economies	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  some	  of	  the	  region’s	  governments	  now	  seem	  more	  aware	  
of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  a	   large-­‐scale	   ‘bias’.	   	   	  Such	  has	  been	  the	  case	   in	  Malawi,	  one	  of	  the	  
region’s	  newest	  reformers.	  	  It	  is	  a	  country	  long	  dependent	  upon	  the	  export	  of	  tobacco,	  but	  
where	   plans	   have	   been	   hatched,	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	   the	   World	   Bank,	   to	   revive	   and	  
expand	  mining	  activity,	   including	   small-­‐scale	  operations.	   	  An	  ASM	  symposium	  was	  held	   in	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the	  Malawian	  capital	  of	  Lilongwe	  on	  11-­‐12	  November	  2014,	  the	  aim	  of	  which	  was	  to	  create	  
a	  space	  for	  the	  sector	  early	  on	  in	  the	  reform	  process.	  	  Significantly,	  at	  this	  symposium,	  there	  
was	  considerable	  discussion	  about	  fostering	  a	  people-­‐centered	  approach	  for	  ASM,	  a	  sector	  
long	   neglected	   by	   government,	   which	   culminated	   in	   the	   Minister	   of	   Natural	   Resources,	  
Energy	  and	  Mining	  conceding	  that	  ‘It	  is	  my	  considered	  view	  that	  if	  we	  are	  to	  overcome	  these	  
challenges,	  we	  need	  to	  transform	  the	  ASM	  subsector	  from	  an	  informal	  to	  a	  formal	  footing’.1	  	  	  
To	  summarize,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  at	   the	  policymaking	   level,	   there	   is	  
discussion	  beginning	   to	   take	  shape	   that	  highlights	   the	  merits	  of	  ASM	  formalization,	  which	  
suggests	  that	  change	  is	  inevitable.	  	  But	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  unlike	  in	  Peru,	  where	  there	  was	  
political	  imperative	  to	  make	  such	  change,	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  the	  momentum	  has	  proved	  
insufficient	  to	  overhaul	  the	  policy	  structures	  and	  institutional	  framework	  which	  stifle,	  rather	  
than	  encourage,	  the	  formalization	  of	  ASM.	  	  As	  will	  be	  highlighted	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  
paper,	  this	   is	   largely	  due	  to	  policymakers	  and	  donors	  not	  being	  able	  to	  discard	  completely	  
the	  idea	  that	  ASM	  is	  populated	  heavily	  by	  rogue	  entrepreneurs.	  
	  
3.3 Entrepreneurial	  Spirit	  
De	  Soto	  seemed	  enamored	  with	  the	  energy	  on	  display	  in	  Peru’s	  ‘extra-­‐legal’	  economy.	  	  He	  
described	   its	  participants	  as	   ‘plucky	  micro-­‐entrepreneurs’,	   the	  movement	  of	  whom,	  to	  the	  
formal	  economy,	  would,	  in	  his	  view,	  generate	  for	  the	  state	  a	  valuable	  stream	  of	  tax	  revenue.	  	  
If	  harnessed	  properly,	  this	  entrepreneurial	  spirit,	  hinted	  De	  Soto,	  would	  facilitate	  economic	  
growth	  whilst	  simultaneously	  raising	  the	  living	  standards	  of	  the	  excluded.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  ‘New	  policy	  raises	  hope	  for	  Malawian	  small-­‐scale	  miners’,	  Mining	  Review,	  December	  2014	  




This	   view	   has	   attracted	   criticism,	   largely	   because	   ‘extra-­‐legals’	   were	   projected	   as	   a	  
homogenous	  group.	  	  Specifically,	  despite	  recognition	  at	  the	  time	  that	  the	  informal	  economy	  
is	   heterogeneous	   in	   its	   composition,	  De	   Soto,	   it	   is	   often	   argued,	   ‘equates	   every	   informal-­‐
sector	  worker	  with	  a	  potential	  entrepreneur’	  and	  thus	  ‘the	  entire	  informal	  sector	  is	  seen	  as	  
formed	   by	   entrepreneurs,	   or	   would-­‐be	   entrepreneurs,	   coerced	   by	   state	   regulation’	  
(Itzigsohn,	  2000,	  p.	  8).	  	  As	  noted,	  similar	  views	  have	  been	  voiced	  about	  ASM:	  how,	  up	  until	  
the	   1990s,	   the	   general	   belief	   was	   that	   the	   sector	   was	   populated	   by	   mostly	   enterprising	  
businessmen,	   a	   perception	   that	   would	   inform	   landmark	   policy	   documents	   such	   as	   A	  
Strategy	  for	  African	  Mining	  (World	  Bank,	  1992).	  	  	  
As	   explained	   and	   as	   numerous	   studies	   have	   shown,	   however,	   a	   sizable	   share	   of	   those	  
engaged	   in	   ASM	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   have	   done	   so	   because	   of	   hardship	   (see	   e.g.	  
Banchirigah,	  2006;	  Kelly,	  2014).	   	  There	  is	  certainly	  some	  entrepreneurial	  energy	  present	   in	  
the	  region’s	  ‘rush-­‐type’	  environments	  but	  as	  Hilson	  (2010)	  explains,	  the	  common	  theme	  in	  
the	   region	   has	   been	   that,	   once	   established,	   sites	   seem	   to	   gradually	   transform	   into	  
destinations	   for	   poverty-­‐stricken	   people.	   	   In	   the	   Philippines,	   where	   as	   Verbrugge	   (2015)	  
reports,	   ‘ASM	  has	   reached	  a	  more	  advanced	  stage,	  and	   is	   characterized	  by	  differentiation	  
between	   a	   dominant	   stratum	   of	   ASM	   entrepreneurs,	   and	   a	   massive	   workforce’,	   existing	  
causal	  explanations	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  persistence	  of	  informality	  in	  the	  sector	  (p.	  1024).	  	  
But	   whilst	   such	   heterogeneity	   persists	   in	   a	   host	   of	   ASM	   sites	   across	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	  
here,	   it	   is	  more	  of	  a	  case	  of	  the	  type	  of	  entrepreneurship	  being	  unique	  altogether	  (Hilson,	  
2010).	  	  	  
Specifically,	   the	   situation	   facing	   many	   people	   here	   tends	   to	   be	   reminiscent	   of	   ‘necessity	  
entrepreneurship’,	  or	  the	   idea	  that	  endemic	  poverty	  and	  a	   lack	  of	  economic	  opportunities	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have	  driven	  –	   in	   this	   instance	  –	  scores	  of	  Africans	   to	  become	  entrepreneurs	  purely	  out	  of	  
need.	  	  Such	  activities	  are	  ‘high	  particularly	  at	  low	  levels	  of	  economic	  development…[but	  as]	  
an	   economy	   develops,	   the	   level	   of	   necessity-­‐driven	   entrepreneurial	   activity	   gradually	  
declines	  as	  productive	  sectors	  grow	  and	  supply	  more	  employment	  opportunities’	  (Bosma	  et	  
al.,	   2008,	   p.	   7).	   Given	   the	   rich	   diversity	   of	   people	   now	   engaged	   in	   ASM,	   therefore,	   it	   is	  
unclear	  how	  De	  Soto’s	  recipe	  for	  activating	  ‘dead	  capital’	  would	  yield	  immediate	  economic	  
returns	   in	   the	  way	  he	  predicts.	   	   	  There	   is	  also	   the	   issue	  of	  a	   significant	  number	  of	  people	  
across	  the	  region	  who	  take	  up	  work	  in	  the	  sector	  having	  non-­‐mining	  backgrounds:	  students	  
looking	   to	   generate	   income	   to	   pay	   their	   tuition	   fees,	   subsistence	   farmers	   seeking	   to	  
accumulate	   earnings	   to	   purchase	   agricultural	   inputs,	   people	   with	   university	   degrees	   and	  
work	  experience	   in	  different	   fields,	  and	  redundant	   large-­‐scale	  mine	  workers.	   	  Presumably,	  
many	  of	   these	  people	  engage	   in	  ASM	   temporarily,	   and	  would	  abandon	   their	  work	   should	  
alternative	   employment	   more	   closely	   aligned	   with	   their	   backgrounds	   were	   to	   become	  
available,	   a	   change	  which	  would	   surely	  materialize	   following	   the	   activation	  of	   their	   ‘dead	  
capital’.	  
The	  next	  section	  of	  the	  paper	  elaborates	  on	  these	  ideas,	  drawing	  on	  findings	  from	  research	  
conducted	   in	   Ghana	   and	   Niger.	   	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	   De	   Soto	   framework	   goes	   a	   long	   way	  
toward	  explaining	  why	  ASM	  is	  mostly	  informal	  in	  both	  countries	  but	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  lasting	  
solution	  for	  empowering	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  sector.	  	  	  
	  




To	  recapitulate,	  for	  De	  Soto,	  the	  informal	  economy	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  burdens	  imposed	  by	  
state	   regulations	   on	   the	   entrepreneurial	   activities	   of	   the	   poor	   (Itzigsohn,	   2008).	   	   For	   his	  
legalist	   camp,	   the	   removal	   of	   bureaucracy	   and	   the	   conversion	   of	   informally-­‐held	   assets	  
would	   facilitate	   economic	   freedom	   and	   entrepreneurship	   among	   poor	   working	   people	  
(Chen,	   2007).	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   ASM,	   formalization,	   suggest	   Siegel	   and	   Veiga	   (2009),	   could	  
improve	  markedly	  if	  governments	  consider	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  extra-­‐legal	  economy	  when	  
overhauling	  policy.	   	  With	   the	   formalization	  of	  ASM	  rising	  quickly	  on	   the	  agendas	  of	  major	  
donors	  and	  NGOs,	  now	  would	  be	  an	  ideal	  time	  to	  engage	  critically	  with	  such	  ideas.	  
	  Focusing	   on	   the	   cases	   of	   Ghana	   and	   Niger,	   the	   locations	   of	   two	   dynamic	   –	   and	   very	  
different	   –	   ASM	   economies	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa,	   this	   section	   of	   the	   paper	   interrogates	  
these	   ideas	   further.	   	   For	   the	   former,	   the	   analysis	   draws	   on	   findings	   from	   interviews	  
conducted	  with	  a	  combined	  31	  operators	  (the	  point	  at	  which	  saturation	  was	  reached)	  in	  two	  
of	   the	   country’s	   largest	   informal	   gold	   mining	   communities:	   Japa	   (Western	   Region)	   and	  
Pukukrum	  (Ashanti	  Region).	  	  Interviews	  were	  also	  conducted	  in	  the	  country	  capital	  of	  Accra	  
with	   10	   government	   officials	   based	   at	   the	   main	   institutions	   which	   regulate	   and	   support	  
ASM;	  officials	   from	   five	  microfinance/banking	   institutions	   encouraged	   to	  provide	   financial	  
assistance	  to	  ASM;	  and	  representatives	   from	  five	  NGOs	  which	  also	  provide	  support	   to	  the	  
sector.	   	   This	   research	  was	   conducted	   over	   two	   periods:	   February-­‐August	   2014,	   and	  May-­‐
September	   2015.	   	   In	   Niger,	   complementary	   fieldwork	  was	   undertaken,	   during	   the	   period	  
May-­‐June	  2015,	  in	  the	  two	  gold	  mining	  communities	  of	  Koma	  Bangou	  and	  M’Banga,	  where	  
combined,	  12	  in-­‐depth	  life	  histories	  were	  conducted	  with	  resident	  miners.	  	  Semi-­‐structured	  




Drawing	  on	  findings	  from	  these	  interviews,	  the	  analysis	  that	  follows	  reaffirms	  points	  raised	  
in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  the	  paper:	  that	  whilst	  De	  Soto’s	  ideas	  help	  to	  explain	  how,	  in	  both	  
cases,	  informal	  ASM	  has	  been	  ‘created’,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  fall	  short	  in	  contextualizing	  
why	  it	  persists	  and	  more	  importantly,	  how	  it	  can	  be	  addressed.	  
	  
	  
4.1 ‘Creating’	  Informality	  and	  Political	  Drive	  
As	   in	   Peru,	   in	   both	   Niger	   and	   Ghana,	   all	   signs	   point	   to	   state	   bureaucracies	   ‘creating’	   an	  
informal	   economy.	   	   It	   is	   apparent	   that	   neither	   country	   has	   implemented	   effective	   ASM	  
formalization	  strategies.	  	  Both	  states	  are	  largely	  responsible	  for	  perpetuating	  the	  growth	  of	  
their	  informal	  ASM	  economies.	  	  	  
In	   Niger,	   the	   authorities	   lack	   the	   capacity	   to	   adequately	   manage	   the	   estimated	   450,000	  
people	  engaged	  in	  ASM	  in	  the	  country	  (BNIC/SCP,	  2013).	  One	  government	  official	  admitted	  
as	  much	  in	  an	  interview,	  explaining	  that	  ‘Thus	  far,	  all	  attempts	  to	  control	  small-­‐scale	  mining	  
activities	  have	  failed	  [and]	  therefore,	  miners	  are	  left	  to	  their	  own	  devices	  and	  operate	  under	  
unrecorded	  customary	  laws’.2	  This	  has	  certainly	  not	  escaped	  donors,	  particularly	  the	  World	  
Bank,	  which	  has	  consistently	  produced	  documents	  highlighting	  the	  woeful	   inadequacies	  of	  
the	  regulatory	  and	  support	  apparatus	  for	  ASM	  in	  Niger.	  	  World	  Bank	  officials	  have	  called	  on	  
donors	   and	   the	   government	   to	   administer	   support	   to	   the	   country’s	   small-­‐scale	  miners,	   in	  
particular,	   equipment;	   organize	   artisans	   into	   groups	   or	   cooperatives	   to	   put	   them	   in	   a	  
position	  to	  benefit	   from	  different	  types	  of	  support	   in	   formal	  settings	  (lines	  of	  credit,	  etc.);	  
train	  small-­‐scale	  enterprises	  to	  fabricate	  processing	  units	  for	  crushing,	  grinding,	  and	  washing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Interview,	  government	  official,	  Niamey.	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ores,	  especially	  gold,	   to	   increase	  recovery	   rates;	  and	  encourage	   the	  adaptation	  of	  existing	  
laws	   or	   passing	   of	   new	   regulations	   for	   the	   artisanal	  mining	   sector	  which	   guarantee	   some	  
security	   of	   tenure	   (World	   Bank,	   2010).	   	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   that,	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   these	  
objectives,	   the	  administrative	   framework	  and	   institutional	  capacity	  must	  be	  strengthened,	  
mine	   staff	   must	   be	   trained,	   a	   computerized	   mining	   register	   must	   be	   established,	   and	  
relevant	  mine	  data	  must	  be	  collected	  (IMF,	  2013).	  
It	  appears,	  however,	  that	  little	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  toward	  fulfilling	  either	  task,	  despite	  
the	  efforts	  of	   the	  European	  Union	   to	  make	  available	  a	   substantial	   share	  of	  monies	   locked	  
into	   the	   35	   million	   Euro	   Projet	   d’Assistance	   aux	   Petites	   Entreprises	   et	   Artisans	   Miniers	  
(PAPEAM)	  for	  ASM	  support.	   	  Funds	  were	  used	  to	  train	  200	  government	  officers	   in	  various	  
geological	   issues	   and	   GIS,	   collect	   crucial	   geological	   data,	   and	   equip	   high-­‐ranking	   officials	  
with	  know-­‐how	  and	  advice	  on	  ASM	  policy.3	  	  According	  to	  one	  miner,	  however,	  these	  moves	  
have	  had	  little	  impact	  because,	  in	  his	  view,	  ‘ministry	  officials	  only	  operate	  to	  take	  taxes	  and	  
do	   no	   educational	   work	   related	   to	   the	   mineral	   treatment	   and	   transformation’.4	   Another	  
added	  that	   ‘At	  the	  ministry	   level,	  that’s	  where	  we	  find	  the	  biggest	  problems	  [because]	  we	  
put	  down	  requests	  for	  permits	  since	  2012,	  we	  even	  paid	  and	  till	  now	  we	  have	  no	  response	  
from	  the	  ministry’.5	  	  Moreover,	  formalizing	  activities	  –	  that	  is,	  what	  must	  be	  done	  in	  order	  
to	  operate	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  Niger’s	  Mining	  Code	  –	  costs	  up	  to	  nine	  
times	   a	   miner’s	   yearly	   income,	   as	   it	   incurs	   a	   range	   of	   fees,	   including	   payments	   for	   road	  
usage,	  on	  mule	  carts,	  gold	  value	  and	  royalties.	  	  In	  the	  opinion	  of	  these	  miners,	  the	  costs	  and	  
the	  bureaucracy	  attached	  to	  paying	  them	  are	  stifling	  formalization.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  ‘A	  geological	  and	  mining	  information	  system	  for	  Niger’,	  http://www.brgm.eu/projects/geological-­‐mining-­‐
information-­‐system-­‐niger	  (Accessed	  12	  October	  2015).	  
4	  Interview,	  miner,	  Komabangou.	  
5	  Interview,	  miner,	  Komabangou.	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In	   Ghana,	   this	   is	   an	   old	   story.	   	   Here,	   Hilson	   and	   Potter	   (2003)	   first	   identified	   cost	   and	  
bureaucracy	  as	  major	  impediments	  to	  ASM	  formalization	  over	  a	  decade	  ago.	  	  The	  issue	  was	  
revisited	   recently	   by	   Hilson	   et	   al.	   (2014),	   who	   reported	   that	   registration	   costs	   for	   the	  
prospective	   licensee	  now	  exceed	  US$1000.	   	  Rather	   inexplicably,	   in	  response	  to	  complaints	  
voiced	  by	  miners,	  the	  government	  has	  elected	  to	  increase	  the	  fee,	  most	  recently,	  the	  cost	  of	  
a	   mandatory	   Environmental	   Protection	   Agency	   (EPA)	   Permit,	   which	   has	   risen	   from	  
approximately	  US$300	  to	  US$3500.	  	  The	  decision	  has	  attracted	  even	  more	  criticism.6	  	  When	  
asked	   about	   why	   the	   move	   was	   made,	   a	   former	   government	   official	   explained	   in	   an	  
interview	   that	   ‘they	   [government	   officials]	   have	   to	   generate	   enough	   revenue	   to	   pay	  
themselves…	   [because	   the]	   government	   does	   not	   have	   money,	   so	   they	   need	   to	   pay	  
themselves’.7	  
Why,	   then,	   despite	   the	   galvanizing	   interest	   in	   ASM	   formalization	   on	   the	   development	  
agenda,	   have	   the	   governments	   of	   both	  Niger	   and	  Ghana	   failed	   to	   embrace	   the	   challenge	  
proactively?	  	  Unlike	  in	  Peru,	  and	  a	  point	  raised	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  this	  paper,	  there	  
does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  any	  political	   imperative	  to	  do	  so.	   	   In	  Ghana,	  despite	  rhetoric	  which	  
may	  suggest	  otherwise,	  calls	  to	  streamline	  the	  regulations	  for	  ASM	  have	  led	  to	  institutional	  
changes	  that	  have	   impeded	  as	  opposed	  to	  facilitated	   formalization.	   	  Notably,	  the	  Minerals	  
Commission,	   the	   chief	   government	   agency	   in	   charge	   of	   regulating	   and	   licensing	   ASM,	  
recently	   dismantled	   its	   ‘Small-­‐Scale	  Mining’	   division.	   Officials	   with	   specific	   administrative	  
duties	  in	  the	  sector	  now	  find	  themselves	  reporting	  to	  different	  managers,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  has	  
led	   to	   further	   delays	   on	   licensing	   decisions.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   administrative	   setup	   has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  ‘Small	  Scale	  Miners	  complain	  of	  delays	  in	  obtaining	  licenses’,	  
https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2015/10/26/small-­‐scale-­‐miners-­‐complain-­‐of-­‐delays-­‐in-­‐obtaining-­‐
licenses/	  (Accessed	  31	  October	  2015).	  
7	  Interview,	  government	  official,	  Accra.	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changed	  radically	  since	  the	  government	  launched	  the	  Small-­‐Scale	  Mining	  Project	  (SSMP),	  a	  
four-­‐pronged	  institutional	  setup	  established	  to	  support	  ASM,	  in	  the	  early-­‐1990s	  (Hilson	  and	  
Potter,	   2003).	   	   	   One	   institutional	   prong,	   the	   Geological	   Survey	   Department,	   which	   was	  
initially	  tasked	  with	  prospecting	  and	  demarcating	  areas	  suitable	  for	  small-­‐scale	  mining,	  has	  –	  
for	   reasons	   that	  are	   still	   unclear	  –	  abandoned	   its	  duties.	   	  Another	   institutional	  prong,	   the	  
Mines	   Department,	   which	   was	   initially	   commissioned	   to	   address	   all	   health	   and	   safety	  
concerns,	  became	  the	  Inspectorate	  Division	  of	  the	  Minerals	  Commission	  in	  2006.	  	  	  
It	   is	   no	   secret	   that	   formalization	   of	   ASM	   has	   taken	   a	   back	   seat	   to	   the	   Government	   of	  
Ghana’s	   efforts	   to	   promote	   foreign	   investment	   in	   its	   large-­‐scale	   gold	   mining	   economy,	  
which	  could	  in	  part	  explain	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  moves.	  	  Here,	  an	  estimated	  25	  percent	  of	  
the	   country	   has	   been	   demarcated	   for	   reconnaissance,	   mineral	   exploration	   and	   mining	  
purposes	  (Cuba	  et	  al.,	  2014):	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  there	  were	  11	  operating	  mines	  and	  at	  
least	   230	   active	   prospecting	   licenses	   in	   the	   country.	   	   Although	   there	   is	   a	   system	   of	  
transferable	   mineral	   rights	   in	   place,	   the	   government	   must	   now	   rely	   on	   the	   goodwill	   of	  
managers	  of	  individual	  mining	  companies	  to	  release	  unused	  sections	  of	  their	  concessions	  to	  
small-­‐scale	  operators.	  	  Similar	  phenomena	  (see	  Hilson,	  2017	  for	  details)	  have	  been	  observed	  
in	   Tanzania	   (Lissu,	   2004;	   Lange,	   2006),	   Liberia	   (Wallace	   and	   Lepol,	   2008)	   and	   DR	   Congo	  
(World	   Bank,	   2008).	   	   Officials	   at	   the	   World	   Bank	   seem	   concerned	   that	   the	   same	   could	  
happen	   in	   Niger,	   cautioning	   that,	   ‘Small-­‐scale	   mining	   should	   not	   be	   overlooked	   in	   the	  
excitement	  over	  industrial	  mining’	  (World	  Bank,	  2010,	  p.	  ix).	  	  	  
In	  summary,	  when	  examined	  through	  a	  legalist	  ‘lens’,	  in	  both	  Ghana	  and	  Niger,	  it	  becomes	  
quite	  clear	  how	  the	  policy	   frameworks	   in	  place	   for	  ASM	  are	   stifling	   formalization,	   in	   turn,	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fueling	  the	  growth	  of	  ‘extra-­‐legal’	  activity.	  	  Unlike	  in	  Peru,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  incentive	  
for	  either	  government	  at	  this	  point	  to	  review	  its	  ASM	  formalization	  strategies.	  
	  
4.2 Formalizing	  Small-­‐Scale	  Mining:	  A	  Legalist	  Perspective	  	  
To	  recapitulate,	  according	  to	  De	  Soto,	  if	  the	  deeds,	  titles	  and	  permits	  only	  recognized	  in	  the	  
extra-­‐legal	  space	  were	  formalized,	  it	  would	  provide	  the	  poor	  with	  the	  asset	  base	  needed	  to	  
improve	  their	   livelihoods.	   	  Siegel	  and	  Veiga	  (2009)	  lobbied	  strongly	  for	  this,	  and,	  similar	  to	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  US	  1872	  Mining	  Act	  was	  drafted,	  for	  scholars	  to	  study	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
the	   ‘extra-­‐legal’	   economy	   and	   to	   use	   these	   data	   to	   inform	   the	   design	   and	   redrafting	   of	  
policies	   and	   regulations	   for	   ASM.	   	   But	   whilst	   valuable	   insight	   would	   no	   doubt	   be	   gained	  
through	  such	  a	  grassroots	  approach,	  the	  view	  here	  is	  that,	  should	  the	  recommendations	  put	  
forward	  by	   the	   legalist	   camp	  be	  adopted	   in	  Ghana	  and	  Niger,	   they	  would	   yield	   very	   little	  
change,	  even	  if	  the	  formalization	  of	  ASM	  suddenly	  became	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  governments	  of	  
these	  countries.	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why.	  
First,	   the	  assumption	  being	  made	  by	   legalists	   is	   that	   the	  activation	  of	   ‘dead	  capital’	   in	   the	  
‘extra-­‐legal’	   economy	   will	   lead	   to	   the	   empowerment	   of	   the	   excluded	   –	   in	   this	   case,	  
unlicensed	  small-­‐scale	  miners.	  	  	  It	  is	  unclear,	  however,	  whether	  a	  move	  to	  legitimize	  licenses	  
would	  provide	  the	  path	  needed	  for	  miners	  to	  transition	  away	  from	  the	  informal	  economy,	  
which,	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  regulation	  and	  monitoring	  from	  government,	  has	  become	  deeply	  
entrenched.	   	   In	   Ghana,	   as	  mentioned	   earlier,	   over	   the	   past	   five	   years,	   the	   informal	   ASM	  
economy	  has	  rapidly	  become	  populated	  by	  Chinese	  ‘gold	  seekers’	  who	  have	  partnered	  with	  
local	   miners	   (Hilson	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   	   A	   local	   miner	   and	   executive	   member	   of	   a	   grassroots	  
mining	  association	  reflected	  on	  this	  unexpected	  development	  in	  an	  interview:	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[The	  Chinese]	  went	  straight	  to	  villages…some	  are	  sponsoring,	  and	  those	  who	  originally	  
partnered	   with	   Chinese	   were	   licensed	   and	   they	   made	   them	   sign	   an	   agreement	   to	  
reclaim	   the	   [mined-­‐out]	   land.	   	   But	   then	   they	   started	  partnering	  with	   the	   chiefs	   and	  
landlords…8	  
Across	  Ghana,	   informal	  ASM	   spaces	   have	   come	  under	   the	   control	   of	   chiefs	   and	   landlords	  
(landowners),	  who	  are	  also	  rent-­‐seeking,	  charging	  exorbitant	  fees	  to	  access	  land,	  which	  has	  
proved	  to	  be	  a	  major	  barrier	  to	  ‘kick-­‐starting’	  the	  licensing	  process.	  	  	  The	  concern,	  explained	  
one	  miner	  in	  an	  interview,	  is	  that	  ‘no	  chief	  has	  helped	  us’	  with	  licensing	  and	  formalization	  
because	   ‘When	   they	   go	   for	   the	   money	   (collect	   their	   share	   of	   profits),	   they	   spend	   it	  
themselves’.9	  	  Costs	  in	  the	  informal	  ASM	  economy	  have	  risen	  sharply	  since	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  
Chinese.	  	  Another	  operator	  offered	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  during	  an	  interview:	  
As	  for	  the	  farmers	  if	  you	  do	  not	  see	  them	  before	  you	  start	  they	  are	  a	  huge	  hindrance	  
to	  our	  work…what	  we	  do	  is	  that	  before	  we	  enter	  your	  farm,	  we	  come	  to	  your	  home	  
and	   tell	   you	   that	   this	   particular	   farm	   is	   our	   concession	   and	   we	   will	   be	   bringing	   a	  
machine	   to	  work	   in	   it	   next	  week	   so…he’ll	   say	   no	  way	   but	   then	  we	   also	   explain	   the	  
mineral	   law	   to	   him	   and	   say	   this	   is	   our	   license…the	   government	   has	   given	   us	   the	  
authority	  to	  take	  out	  the	  minerals	   in	  the	  ground	  although	  your	  number	   is	  also	  on	   it,	  
only	   6	   feet	   of	   ground	   is	   yours	   beyond	   that	   you	   the	   farmer	   have	   no	   control	   so	   no	  
matter	  what	  you	  do,	  we’ll	  destroy	  it…but	  we	  should	  compensate	  you	  depending	  upon	  
the	  crop	  type	  on	  it.	  If	  it’s	  cocoa,	  we	  pay	  as	  much	  as	  10,000	  Ghana	  [cedis]	  per	  acre.	  If	  
it’s	   cocoyam,	   mixed	   farm	   we	   pay	   4000…if	   it’s	   free	   land	   with	   nothing	   on	   it	   we	   pay	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Interview,	  miner,	  Pukukrom.	  
9	  Interview,	  miner,	  Pukukrom.	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3000…With	  economic	  trees,	  normally	  it	  depends…the	  cocoa	  is	  10,000,	  palm	  oil	  tree	  is	  
7000	  per	  acre,	  free	  land	  is	  3000	  and	  mixed	  crop	  farms	  are	  4500	  per	  acre…10	  
Similar	  dynamics	  were	  observed	   in	  Niger,	  particularly	   in	  M’Banga,	  where	   it	  was	  explained	  
that	   landowners	   request	   many	   additional	   payments,	   including	   a	   20,000	   CFA	   fee	   for	  
accessing	  a	  pit,	  2000	  CFA	  for	  an	  ID	  card	  and	  a	  share	  of	  ore	  mined.11	  	  Interestingly,	  De	  Soto	  
himself	   acknowledged	   the	   dynamic	   character	   of	   the	   extra-­‐legal	   economy,	   explaining	   that	  
‘Any	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	   unified	   property	   system	   that	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	  
collective	   contracts	   that	   underpin	   existing	   property	   arrangements	  will	   crash	   into	   the	   very	  
roots	  of	  the	  rights	  most	  people	  rely	  on	  for	  holding	  onto	  their	  assets’	  (De	  Soto,	  2000,	  p.	  171).	  	  
But	   as	   opposed	   to	   viewing	   this	   as	   a	   potential	   barrier	   to	   informality,	   he	   rather	   saw	   it	   as	  
justification	  to	  formalize.	  
A	  second	  reason	  concerns	  the	   ‘mind-­‐set’	  and	  priorities	  of	   those	  engaged	   in	  what	   legalists,	  
foremost	  De	  Soto	  (2000),	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  ‘extra-­‐legal’	  ASM	  economy	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  
As	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  ASM	  sites	  are	  home	  to	  an	  eclectic	  group	  
of	  people,	  each	  with	  very	  different	  backgrounds	  but	  who	  mostly	  pursue	  such	  work	  for	  the	  
same	  reason:	  namely,	  because	  of	  personal	  hardship.	  	  For	  De	  Soto,	  ‘formalizing’	  the	  titles	  of	  
these	  individuals	  would	  –	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  –	  mean	  legitimizing	  them	  as	  miners.	  	  But	  this	  
rather	  naïvely	  assumes	  that	  if	  empowered,	  these	  individuals	  would	  continue	  mining.	  	  There	  
are	   certainly	   examples	   cited	   in	   the	   literature	   of	   individuals	   using	   ASM	   as	   a	   platform	   for	  
wealth	   creation,	   generating	  money	   for	   agricultural	   projects,	   financing	   the	   construction	   of	  
better	   housing,	   and	   funding	   side	   businesses	   such	   as	   hotels	   and	   chemical	   dispensaries	  
(Werthmann,	  2009;	  Hilson	  and	  Garforth,	  2013).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Interview,	  miner,	  Japa.	  US$1	  =	  3.8	  Ghana	  cedis.	  	  
11	  Interview,	  miner,	  M’Banga.	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Similar	   developments	  were	  observed	   at	   the	   study	   sites.	   	   In	  Ghana,	   there	  were	   reports	   of	  
miners,	  despite	  their	  struggles	  with	  landowners	  and	  chiefs,	  having	  used	  remaining	  profits	  to	  
finance	  new	  business	  ventures,	  the	  most	  popular	  being	  petrol	  stations;	  to	  pay	  for	  children’s	  
school	   fees	   and	   university	   tuition;	   and	   to	   revitalize	   agriculture,	   particularly	   cocoa	   farms.	  	  
One	   miner	   was	   quick	   to	   point	   out	   in	   an	   interview	   that	   despite	   not	   having	   a	   license,	   he	  
provides	  ‘furniture	  to	  support	  the	  school	  children’,	  that	  the	  ‘road	  from	  Dunkwa	  to	  town	  was	  
constructed	  by	  this	  dozer	  and	  we	  shaped	  it	  nicely	  for	  them	  so	  we	  really	  help	  them’,	  and	  that	  
‘at	   times	  we	  give	   them	   [the	   school	   teachers]	   a	   100	  bags	  of	   cement	   for	   renovation	  of	   the	  
school	   building’.12	   	  Moreover,	   the	  miners	   interviewed	   in	   Ghana	  were,	   for	   the	  most	   part,	  
appreciative	   that	   they	   had	   a	   steady	   income.	   	  One	  miner	  went	   as	   far	   as	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	  
wider	  impact	  ASM	  was	  having	  on	  youth,	  pointing	  out	  –	  and	  reinforcing	  claims	  made	  earlier	  –	  
that	  ‘All	   I	  will	  say	  is	  that	  the	  work	  has	  been	  beneficial	  [because]	  the	  young	  men	  who	  were	  
previously	   unemployed	   have	   all	   got	   jobs	   now	   and	   this	   has	   reduced	   stealing	   in	   the	  
community’.13	  	  But	  despite	  embracing	  ASM,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  a	  move	  to	  formalize	  would	  
further	   galvanize	   the	   entrepreneurial	   spirit	   at	   the	   study	   sites.	   	   Most	   of	   the	   people	  
interviewed	   could	   be	   considered	   ‘necessity	   entrepreneurs’,	   do	   not	   have	   mining	  
backgrounds,	  and	  gave	  the	   impression	  that	  they	  would	   likely	  pursue	  another	   line	  of	  work,	  
including	  farming,	  if	  they	  were	  empowered.	  
In	   Niger,	   identifying	   the	   equivalent	   of	   the	   ‘extra-­‐legal	   entrepreneur’	   proved	   equally	  
challenging.	   	   	   Those	   interviewed	   in	  M’Banga	   and	   Koma	   Bangou	   shared	   similar	   stories	   to	  
those	  told	  in	  Ghana.	   	  The	  ‘permanent’	  miners	  consulted	  were	  mostly	  born	  in	  these	  towns,	  
are	   elderly	   and	   have	   families,	   and	   have	   reinvested	   their	   monies	   locally,	   purchasing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Interview,	  miner,	  Pukukrom.	  
13	  Interview,	  miner,	  Pokukrum.	  	  See	  Hilson	  and	  Osei	  (2014).	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equipment,	  making	  use	  of	  ancillary	  mine	  services	  and	  building	  houses.	  	  But	  these	  operators	  
are	  vastly	  outnumbered	  by	  temporary	  migrants	  from	  surrounding	  countries,	  most	  of	  whom	  
send	  their	  earnings	  to	  their	  hometowns	  and	  after	  generating	  enough	  profit,	  acquire	  luxury	  
items	  such	  as	  cars	  and	  appliances	  before	  departing.	  	  As	  one	  permanent	  miner	  pointed	  out	  in	  
an	   interview,	   ‘most	   of	   the	   mining	   activities	   have	   thus	   far	   benefited	   expatriates…there’s	  
people	   from	  everywhere	  […]	   from	  Burkina	  Faso,	  Chad,	  Mali	  even	  Ghana…the	  place	   is	  now	  
full	  of	  foreigners’.14	  	  This	  has	  come	  about	  because	  of	  the	  peripheral	  position	  ASM	  occupies	  
on	  the	  development	  agenda	  of	  Niger.	  What	  De	  Soto	  would	   likely	  consider	  to	  be	  the	   ‘dead	  
capital’	  of	  permanent	  miners,	  therefore,	  cannot	  be	  activated	  unless	  the	  government	  acts	  to	  
create	  a	  much	   larger	   space	   for	   these	  operators.	   	  This	  would	  ultimately	   fuel	   the	  exodus	  of	  
many	   foreign	   operators	   who	   currently	   control	   the	   country’s	   informal	   ASM	   economy.	  	  
Without	  a	  plan	  in	  place	  to	  manage	  this	  transition,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  entrepreneurial	  spirit	  
that	  the	  legalists	  recommend	  be	  harnessed	  could	  dissipate	  altogether.	  
A	  final	  reason	  concerns	  miners’	   levels	  of	  success	   in	  a	  more	   legalized	  setup,	  which	  few	  can	  
predict.	  	  The	  assumption	  made	  is	  that	  securing	  permits	  will	  improve	  miners’	  exposure	  to	  the	  
services	   they	   are	   unable	   to	   access	   in	   the	   informal	   economy,	   in	   turn,	   putting	   them	   in	   an	  
improved	  position	  to	  accumulate	  wealth.	  	  In	  Ghana	  and	  Niger,	  however,	  based	  on	  the	  data	  
collected,	  this	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  the	  case.	  	  Apart	  from	  the	  geological	  services	  of	  both	  
countries	   being	   unable	   to	   equip	   licensees	  with	   reliable	   information	   about	   deposits,	   there	  
continues	   to	   be	   a	   shortage	   of	   finance	   in	   the	   system	   for	   licensed	   operators.	   	   One	   officer	  
interviewed	  from	  a	  microfinance	  institution	  in	  Ghana	  explained	  in	  an	  interview	  that	  ‘he	  used	  
to	  advance	  credit	  to	  ASM	  but	  no	  longer’.	  	  The	  officer	  claimed	  he	  had	  advanced	  –	  admittedly,	  
blindly	  –	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  US	  dollars	  to	  two	  holders	  of	  a	  Small-­‐Scale	  Gold	  Mining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Interview,	  miner,	  M’Banga.	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Licenses.	   	   Both	   licensees,	   however,	   failed	   to	   repay	   their	   loans,	   which	   carried	   a	   monthly	  
interest	   rate	   of	   six	   percent.	   	   It	   was	   explained	   that	   not	   enough	   information	   had	   been	  
gathered	  about	   the	  activities	  beforehand,	  and	   that	   the	   institution,	  along	  with	  many	  other	  
banks	   in	   Ghana,	   no	   longer	   provide	   loads	   to	   ASM,	   simply	   because	   they	   do	   not	   have	   the	  
geological	   and	   technical	   expertise	   in-­‐house.	   	   Unless	   this	   changes,	  miners	  will	   continue	   to	  
rely	   on	   local	   moneylenders	   and	   family	   members	   for	   sponsorship.	   	   It	   is	   exclusively	   these	  
groups	  of	  people	  who	  finance	  activities	  at	   the	  sites	  visited	   in	  Niger.	   	  Until	   local	  banks	  and	  
microfinance	  institutions	  become	  more	  actively	  involved	  in	  supporting	  ASM,	  most	  operators	  
who	  transition	  to	  the	  formal	  economy	  will	  struggle	  to	  secure	  reliable	  sources	  of	  finance.	  
In	  summary,	   this	  discussion	  has	  elaborated	  on	  points	  raised	   in	  the	  previous	  section	  of	   the	  
paper,	  drawing	  on	  experiences	  from	  Ghana	  and	  Niger.	   	  The	  formalization	  of	  ASM	  certainly	  
merits	  priority	  attention	  on	  the	  development	  agenda	   in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	   	  But	  solutions	  
which	  are	  grounded	  in	  legalist	  ideologies	  have	  obvious	  limitations	  in	  this	  context.	  	  The	  extra-­‐
legal	   space	   in	  which	  countless	  miners	  now	  operate	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  has	  nurtured	  an	  
entrepreneurial	   spirit,	   a	   unique	   energy	   which	   would	   not	   necessarily	   carry	   over	   into	   the	  
formal	   economy	   should	   ‘dead	   capital’	   be	   activated.	   	   As	   the	   literature	   and	   the	   case	   study	  
analysis	  presented	  here	  illustrate,	  the	  region’s	  ASM	  sites	  are	  populated	  by	  a	  dynamic	  group	  
of	  individuals,	  many	  of	  whom	  would	  probably	  abandon	  their	  work	  in	  the	  sector	  if	  alternative	  
employment	  was	  available.	   	  De	  Soto’s	  ideas	  and	  the	  legalist	  camp	  more	  broadly,	  however,	  
do	  help	  to	  explain	  why,	   in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	   informal	  ASM	  is	  so	  widespread,	  specifically,	  
how	  host	  governments	  have	   ‘created’	  and	  ultimately	  preserved	  what	  could	  be	  considered	  
the	   equivalent	   of	   the	   sector’s	   extra-­‐legal	   segment.	   	   Understanding	   the	   dynamics	   of	   this	  





5. Concluding	  Remarks	  
In	   a	   review	   of	   a	   previous	   draft	   of	   this	   paper,	   a	   colleague	   advised	   the	   authors	   to	   ‘move	  
beyond	   an	   engagement	  with	  De	   Soto,	   by	   including	   some	  of	   his	  more	   vocal	   critics	   –	   or	   at	  
least	   those	  whose	  criticism	   is	  based	  on	   field	   research	  and	  empirical	   reality’.	   	  But	  how	  can	  
this	  be	  done	  if,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ASM,	  the	  ideas	  of	  De	  Soto	  and	  his	  followers	  –	  and	  those	  which	  
other	   schools	   of	   informality	   have	   engaged	   with	   for	   that	   matter	   –	   have	   not	   yet	   arrived?	  	  
Given	   the	   unique	   characteristics	   of	   ASM,	   before	   accepting,	   or	   as	   the	   colleague	   suggests,	  
discarding,	   any	   ideas	   on	   informality,	   each	   must	   be	   revisited,	   unpacked,	   dissected	   very	  
carefully	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  refined	  for	  use	  in	  this	  specific	  context.	  	  The	  ideas	  themselves	  may	  
be	  old;	  but	  they	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  interrogated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ASM,	  a	  sector	  with	  a	  unique	  
‘informal’	  dimension.	  
This	   was	   precisely	   why	   this	   paper	   was	   written:	   to	   provide	   fresh	   insights	   on	   the	   ASM	  
formalization	  challenge,	  through	  a	  case	  study	  of	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  It	  accomplished	  this	  by	  
reviving	   the	   much-­‐maligned	   arguments	   of	   De	   Soto,	   who	   championed	   the	   legitimation	   of	  
titles	  and	  deeds	  in	  the	  extra-­‐legal	  economy	  as	  a	  route	  out	  of	  poverty	  for	  the	  poor	  excluded	  
masses.	  	  As	  the	  formalization	  of	  ASM	  is	  rapidly	  gaining	  traction	  on	  the	  development	  agenda	  
of	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	   a	   revisiting	   of	   De	   Soto’s	   ideas,	   it	   is	   believed,	   could	   be	  worthwhile.	  	  
With	   the	   agenda	   already	   heavily	   prioritizing	   ‘mining	   titling’,	   there	   should	   be	   considerable	  
flexibility	  to	  maneuver.	  
Through	   extensive	   analysis	   of	   the	   literature	   and	   supplementary	   findings	   from	   recent	  
research	  conducted	  in	  Ghana	  and	  Niger,	  the	  article	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  ideas	  put	  forward	  by	  
De	  Soto	  and	  the	  legalist	  camp	  more	  broadly	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  a	  transformative	  effect	  on	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ASM	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  informal	  spaces	  which	  most	  of	  the	  region’s	  
operators	  are	  confined	   to	  nurture	  a	  unique	  behavior	  akin	   to	   ‘necessity	  entrepreneurship’,	  
energy	  which	  would	  not	  necessarily	  carry	  over	  to	  more	  formalized	  settings.	  	  De	  Soto’s	  ideas	  
do,	   however,	   help	   to	   explain	   why	   ASM	   is	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   is	   mostly	   extra-­‐legal	   in	  
character,	   a	   detailed	   understanding	   of	   which	   is	   an	   essential	   starting	   point	   for	   any	  
formalization	  exercise.	  
Whilst	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  legalist	  camp	  have	  some	  mileage	  in	  conceptualizing	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
ASM	   informality	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	   a	  more	  nuanced	   approach	   is	   clearly	   needed	   if	   the	  
sector’s	  operators	  are	  to	  be	  fully	  empowered.	   	  Additional	  analysis	  which	  engages	  with	  the	  
ideas	  of	  the	  legalists	  and	  those	  of	  other	  schools	  on	  informality	  will	  be	  needed	  if	  more	  robust	  
and	   dynamic	   formalization	   strategies	   for	   ASM,	   which	   speak	   to	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   its	  
activities,	  are	  to	  be	  designed	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  and	  elsewhere.	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